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Abstract:-
The end of the Cold War and the apparent “victory” of democracy witnessed a dramatic increase in 
the number, diversity and proportion of states formally committed to democratic principles. Prominent 
international law scholars argued vigorously that representative government was now an international 
legal entitlement.
It is debatable that a right to pro-democratic action, that is intervention to promote democracy exist.
The determined reaction of the United Nations and the Organization of American States to the 
September 1991 overthrow of popularly-elected Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and the 
attendant discussion within the Organization of American States about the possible use of force to 
restore the “legitimate” government, certainly created the impression that such action –was becoming 
politically palatable. An impression seemingly reinforced by the recent democratic crusade in Iraq 
under the banner of “regime change” in Iraq.
However, the developing world is especially wary of the new world order democratic discourse which 
is seen as promoting a conservative and protective form of liberal democracy hostile to the evolution of 
other popular and participatory democratic processes and thus part of a subtle Western expansionist 
agenda. The paper argues for a recognition that liberal democracy should adopt a composite and 
heterogeneous, dimension that acknowledges democratic diversity. Further, for democracy to “work” 
it must be the preference of a given citizenry and be anchored in the socio-political landscape of of the 
specific community rather than be imposed from above by a third party. This crucial point has been 
overlooked by many proponents of the right to democracy. It is argued that the direct replication of the 
Western liberal democratic model should be alive to the reality that good governance is a complex 
relationship between the government and governed not guaranteed simply by “importing” successful 
and  neutral “universalized” democratic norms .
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DEMOCRACY’S GLOBAL QUEST: A NOBLE CRUSADE 
WRAPPED IN DIRTY REALITY?
[…virtually all initiatives--whether they be “development” “good governance” “democracy” 
or the “rule of law”--or indeed, the earlier initiatives of ‘sovereignty’ and the very foundation 
of international law, the nation-state--represent a basic movement from West to East. The 
initiatives involve the transference of a set of institutions and practices which have ostensibly 
been perfected in the European world and which must now be adopted in the non-European 
world if it is to make any progress … the liberatory potential of such initiatives must be 
viewed with skepticism, given that they are inevitably mired in a complex and ongoing set of 
power relations between the European and none-European worlds. At the very least, these 
initiatives suggest, often with an insidious and patronizing benevolence, that peoples in the 
non-European worlds are lacking in their own ideas as to how their societies should be 
structured, and what values they should prescribe and adopt.]1
I. Introduction
The end of the Cold War, which paralyzed the United Nations from its inception, was 
a cause for celebration and hope. Western leaders congratulated themselves over the 
end of communism and the fall of the Soviet empire. New challenges arising from the 
strengthening of international human rights norms and the seemingly unprecedented 
spirit of international cooperation accompanied the end of bipolar geostrategic and 
ideological confrontation. Liberal-democratic political values increased immensely in 
prestige in the wake of the collapse of the Communist Party states of Eastern Europe.2
Authoritarian regimes that for geopolitical reasons were once able to gain automatic 
endorsement and recognition by either side of the Cold War bipolar divide found 
themselves unable to do so as easily. 
‘Whereas coups d’etat and rigged elections in the Cold War era were considered 
business-as-usual,… they [were] now candidates for concerted international response, 
not implausibly extending as far as internationally sanctioned armed intervention.’3
The first shots fired in the name of democracy occurred as the Cold War was 
crumbling. In the aftermath of the 1989 Panamanian elections, there was widespread 
agreement among observers, not only as to the fraudulent character of the elections 
but also as to the landslide victory of the opposition Presidential candidate. This cast 
the legitimacy of the Noriega regime into immediate crisis. Given the verified popular 
mandate for a specific alternative government, the Bush Administration was not 
bashful about making the restoration of democracy through armed force one of the 
articulated objectives of its December 1989 invasion.4 The U.S. excited by the 
seeming triumph of Western liberal democracy asserted before the Organization of 
American States (O.A.S.) in 1989, in rhetorical justification of the U.S. invasion of 
Panama the new wave of democracy:
(A) great principle is spreading across the world like wildfire. That principle, 
as we all know, is the revolutionary idea that the people, not governments, 
are sovereign. This principle has, in (the last) decade, . . . acquired the force 
of historical necessity. . . . Democracy today is synonymous with legitimacy 
the world over; it is, in short, the universal value of our time.5
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In the words of Brad Roth: “Whereas the Reagan Doctrine had purportedly 
emphasized counter intervention and support for indigenous insurgencies, the Bush 
Administration, although proffering at least three alternative justifications, appeared 
to adopt the illegitimacy thesis in its purest form.”6 At the time, the international 
community was not impressed. Both the U.N. General Assembly and the O.A.S. voted 
overwhelmingly to condemn the invasion,7 even though it was common knowledge 
that the advent of democracy in Panama had been frustrated by General Manuel 
Noriega’s authoritarian regime. Most states, (Latin American countries in particular) 
rejected the notion that foreign nations could legitimately employ armed force or 
other measures of coercion to seat a democratically elected government against the 
will of an indigenous political elite in effective control of the state.8 Indeed, many 
states questioned the propriety of any attempt by foreign states to influence domestic 
political processes.9 In an eloquent articulation, Brad Roth observes that:
Although U.S. invocation of the illegitimacy thesis to support unilateral uses 
of force did not by itself signify a change in international law, customary or 
otherwise, the development of international sensibilities should not be 
overlooked. While the international community formally repudiated 
invocation of the illegitimacy thesis, it not only failed to impose sanctions 
against the United States, but continued to look to the United States for 
international leadership (especially in the Persian Gulf crisis) 
notwithstanding what might have been characterized as America’s 
irresponsible attitude toward the use of force and its outright contempt for 
U.N. and World Court censure of its policies. Moreover, the … Panama 
action resulted in the formation of a government that the international 
community promptly recognized.10
It was the unilateralism of the Panama action that guaranteed its broad rejection by the 
international community. With the sanctity of State sovereignty breached, the possible 
consequences of intervention for traditional concepts of international law was too 
profound for States to accept notwithstanding the fact that the concept of 
governmental legitimacy was being fundamentally altered in the post-Cold War era.11
Once States got over their initial jitteriness, states appeared increasingly inclined to 
condone military interventions to restore democracy even though, under traditional 
legal analysis, such interventions fell on rather uncertain legal ground.12  The post-
Cold War era witnessed frequent condemnations of coups particularly in Latin 
America. The O.A.S. condemned attempted coups in Surinam and Venezuela, and 
opposed the now famous “autogolpes” in Peru and Guatemala.13 The O.A.S. also sent 
election monitors and human rights observers to join U.N. personnel in overseeing the 
electoral processes in Nicaragua, Haiti, and other member states. Most significantly, 
the O.A.S., along with virtually the entire international community, condemned the 
Haitian military’s unconstitutional overthrow of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide with 
the O.A.S. acquiescing in the Security Council’s decision to authorize U.S. military 
intervention to restore the deposed President to power.14
While the mantra “democracy is an idea whose time has come” was loudly trumpeted, 
the content of democracy--its criteria and benchmarks--remained bogged down in a 
quagmire of political and human rights discourse. Prominent international law 
scholars argued vigorously that representative government was an emerging 
international legal entitlement.15 Some commentators such as Detter went as far as 
4
adding democracy and viability to the first three criteria of the Montevideo 
Convention, describing democracy as the lynchpin of the definition of new nation-
states.16 Historians and political scientists put forth studies that suggested democracies 
almost never make war on other democracies17 while politicians asserted important 
security interests in the spread of democratic governance. As David Wippman notes, 
“[i]nternational civil servants proclaim[ed] a new shared consensus that democracy, 
human rights, and peace are inextricably linked. Heads of state routinely announce[d] 
their fealty to democratic norms, and insist[ed] that leaders of other states do so as 
well.”18 International organizations passed resolutions announcing that governmental 
legitimacy rests on the consent of the governed, and conditioned membership in their 
organizations on acceptance of democratic principles.19 Even developing countries, 
once near monolithic in their opposition to any external involvement in domestic 
politics, began to commonly seek international legitimacy through external 
monitoring and even supervision of their electoral processes.20
The early post-Cold War years witnessed a dramatic increase in the number, diversity 
and proportion of states formally committed to democratic principles.21 Many states 
displayed a greater willingness to countenance foreign intervention in the name of 
democracy and human rights than at any time in the 20th century.22 But in many 
respects, the rhetoric in this area outpaced reality. Although it is debatable that a right 
to pro-democratic action,23 that is intervention to promote democracy, does not exist, 
such action has certainly become more politically palatable.24 Change in this area is 
neither as extensive nor as legitimacy-oriented as many have suggested.25
The determined reaction of the United Nations and the Organization of American 
States (O.A.S.) to the September 1991 overthrow of popularly-elected Haitian 
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and the attendant discussion within the O.A.S. about 
the possible use of force to restore the “legitimate” government, attested to a shift in 
attitude.26 However, past interventions into domestic affairs and the attendant 
murkiness surrounding these interventions curtailed any development of a broad right 
of pro-democratic intervention despite the broad regional and international support for 
action in Haiti. After all the international community did not need to dig deep into the 
annals of history to refresh their memories of past actions that involved military 
intervention to unseat democratic government or to prevent democracy all carried out 
in the name of democracy.27
Controversy continues to shadow the question of governmental legitimacy. 
Democracy is replete with complexity and ambiguity. Popular will, even if said to be 
the sole criterion, operates at more than one level. Consensus judgment of usurpation 
of people’s will is the exception rather than the norm. Notions of self-determination 
and national equality often prevent broad international consensus Democratic 
entitlement as a universal human right is a complex and multifaceted issue. The 
Article commences with an overview of the development of democracy as a universal 
entitlement within the U.N. system. It then casts an eye on the enshrinement of this 
concept has evidenced by the spate of regional efforts in this direction in the post-
Cold War era. Having laid down the evolution of the concept, the Article turns to a 
critique of the thorny issues attendant surrounding this universal entitlement. 
The central theme of the critique is the fact that in the face of reality, the democratic 
ideal finds itself caught between two opposing forces, the idea not to impose alien 
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values and processes on sovereign nations (as this amounts to deprivation of political 
independence and self-determination), but at the same time not to accept assertions of 
sovereignty simply because a ruler has the brute strength to assert it. The end of the 
Cold War saw the ascendance of liberal democracy as the basis of a new world order 
but this ascendance is seen as strengthening a restrictive practice of democracy and 
threatening to the recognition of democratic heterogeneity. The developing world is 
especially wary of the new world order democratic discourse which is seen as 
promoting a conservative and protective form of liberal democracy hostile to the 
evolution of other popular and participatory democratic processes and thus part of a 
subtle Western expansionist agenda. The section argues for a recognition that liberal 
democracy in its advance to other countries should adopt a composite and 
heterogeneous, dimension that acknowledges democratic diversity thus freeing it from 
its narrow and restrictive liberal roots. To succeed as an unchallenged universal 
concept, democracy should value diversity and communality.
II. Sowing the Seeds: Universalizing Democracy
Traditional international law has generally regarded the peoples of the world as being 
represented in the international arena by the governments in de facto or de jure control 
of their respective states. The method by which a government of domestic origin 
achieves or retains power was not ordinarily thought of as a basis for withholding 
such recognition. As US Chief Justice Taft ruled in the Tinoco Arbitration, the 
domestic constitutionality of the seizure of power is considered beyond the scope of 
international concern: 
The issue is not whether the new government assumes power or conducts its 
administration under constitutional limitations established by the people 
during the incumbency of the government it has overthrown. The question is, 
has it really established itself in such a way that all within its influence 
recognize its control, and that there is no opposing force assuming to be a 
government in its place? Is it discharging its functions as a government 
within its own jurisdiction?28
Four decades later, amidst the creation of the United Nations (U.N.) and its provisions 
trumpeting the right of citizenry to participation and the protection of this right by 
international law, the principle still held sway and was to hold sway way into the 
future. In 1961, Professor Hans Kelsen restated the principle as follows: 
[U]nder what circumstances does a national legal order begin to be valid? 
The answer given by international law is that a national legal order begins to
be valid as soon as it has become--on the whole--efficacious, and it ceases to 
be valid as soon as it loses this efficacy … The Government brought into 
power by a revolution or coup d’etat is, according to international law, the 
legitimate government of the state, whose identity is not affected by these 
events.29
In the 1970s and early 1980s many nation-states and in particular the United Kingdom 
signaled a move away from the constitutive theory championed by Hans Kelsen by 
stating that they would no longer grant or withhold recognition of governments, since 
a policy of recognizing governments gave the impression that their policy of 
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recognizing governments was based on political acceptability. Instead they would 
only recognize nation-states in accordance with international law.30 The persistently 
vexing question in recognition practice was and continues to be the criteria for 
recognition since issues of fact-finding come into play.31 The authors identify popular 
support based on governmental legitimacy as the most controversial and contested of 
the general criteria. This was readily apparent in the Cold War. Determining which 
faction in a civil war enjoyed “popular support,” for example, was largely decided by 
ideological preferences during the Cold War.32 Though states agreed upon standards 
which were objective in theory, they readily injected politics into the actual operation 
of the standard. As Thomas D Grant notes, ‘[t]he principle [of legitimism] has not 
been stable in its content over time, but in one form or another, legitimism has played 
a role in numerous decisions about recognition.’33
During the Cold War, it was nearly impossible for the international community as a 
whole to agree both that a particular state was undemocratic and that international 
action should be taken against that state-- the United States (and the Western Bloc) 
referred to democracy and anti-communist policy as legitimating criteria; the Soviet 
Union (and the Eastern Bloc) to socialism. The single exception concerned the 
process of decolonization. A consensus gradually developed within the UN that the 
denial of majority self-rule in the colonial territories of Africa and Asia should be 
treated as an international delict.34 The nature of the Cold War facilitated the 
entrenchment of self-determination as a jus cogens norm and the development of the 
comparatively firmly rooted criteria that a government be denied recognition if its 
origins violated this jus cogens norm. When white minority regimes in South Africa 
and elsewhere resisted the transition to majority rule, states could agree, within the 
context of the UN system, to apply economic and diplomatic sanctions.35 By defining 
apartheid regimes as per se violative of international law,36 states could treat the 
character of the white minority governments as a legitimate subject for international 
action, without exposing all undemocratic regimes to similar scrutiny and pressure.
It is significant that in the case of South African diplomatic credentials were denied 
on the basis of the internal character of the regime.37 Through its de jure violations of 
one of the U.N. Charter’s few unambiguous and broadly supported norms--racial 
equality--the South African Government subjected itself to ever-increasing scrutiny 
and disapproval from the General Assembly, embodied in innumerable resolutions, 
including refusals to take action on credentials. These measures culminated in the 
passage by the General Assembly of a resolution declaring that the South African 
regime had no right to represent the people of South Africa and that the liberation 
movements recognized by the Organization of African Unity were the authentic 
representatives of the overwhelming majority of the South African people.38 The 
general consensus regarding the illegality of the South African regime was an 
exception as the history of U.N. credentials controversies in the Cold War era attests. 
It is instructive that the international community’s views in this era regarding regime 
legitimacy were generally permissive and often international recognition of 
governments favored the government (whether legitimate or illegitimate) in effective 
power rather than some seemingly legitimate putative authority.39 This was 
notwithstanding General Assembly passed Resolution 396, passed shortly after the 
U.N. was created. This Resolution states clearly that: 
7
whenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to 
represent a Member State in the United Nations and this question becomes 
the subject of controversy in the United Nations, the question should be 
considered in the light of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter and the 
circumstances of each case....40 [Emphasis added]
Though the idea that the international community can protect human rights was one of 
the great practical achievements manifested in the U.N. Charter with international law 
at the vanguard of giving tangible expression to the rights, the Cold War tied the issue 
to ideological and revolutionary agendas. ‘Common interest’ and ‘common good’ 
were seen as nothing more than a diplomatic screen hiding the avaricious and 
predatory aims of the imperialist Powers.41 The effect of this position was to 
strengthen sovereignty considerations as the UN became a ground for cultivating the 
agenda of nationalism brought to the fore with the appearance of the ‘Third World’ as 
a force in the years after World War II. Realpolitik not law was the governing force in 
the Cold War era with the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter frozen on paper 
and rarely seen in practice. 
Amidst the volatile Cold War era politics, the UN was making steady progress in 
support of democratic governance. The first step was taken three short years after its 
formation when the U.N. adopted the groundbreaking Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights by consensus.42 A number of articles in the Universal Declaration 
substantiate provisions of the U.N. Charter relating to the rights of the citizenry in 
member states. Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter contain specific provisions in 
this respect. Article 55(c) of the U.N. Charter commits the Organization to the 
promotion of “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” Under 
Article 56, “All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-
operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in 
Article 55.” Although falling far short of authorizing intervention--unilateral or 
multilateral--to compel compliance with human rights standards, these provisions do 
make clear that the pursuit of human rights does not, as such, constitute intervention 
“in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction” under Article 2(7). 
The United Nations promulgated instruments that are collectively equivalent to an 
International Bill of Rights43 and helped gather international consensus for the idea 
that the populations of States have rights under international law. This extends to the 
protection of the rights, even against the government. Beginning with the Charter and 
the Universal Declaration, the U.N. has constructed a normative framework for the 
realization of rights for the people.44 The framework has been sustained over time by 
the actions of States in signing and ratifying various international human rights and 
related instruments, some of which are now part of customary international law. The 
international collaborative efforts involving United Nations organs, human rights 
workers and others have helped publicize the plight of the oppressed millions who 
yearn for more personal liberties and freedom from arbitrary detention, execution and 
political purges.
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Among the human rights deemed fit objects of international concern is the right of 
political participation. This right was embodied in Article 21 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights as follows: 
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives. 
2. Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country. 
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; 
this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be 
by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by 
equivalent free voting procedures.45
Article 21 of the Declaration states that “[t]he will of the people shall be the basis of 
the authority of government,” and that “this will shall be expressed in periodic and 
genuine elections.”46 Implicitly, then, Article 21 links governmental legitimacy to 
respect for the popular will. But this linkage does not appear in the subsequent, and 
legally binding, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).47
Article 25 of the Covenant speaks of the right to participate in public affairs--
including the right to genuine and periodic elections--but it does not purport to 
condition governmental authority on respect for the will of the people.48 The language 
of Article 25 was intentionally drafted broadly enough to accommodate the wide 
range of governmental systems in place among the initial parties to the Covenant.49
As a result, even Soviet-bloc states felt free to ratify the Covenant.50 From their 
perspective, communist states satisfied the requirements of Article 25 by affording 
voters access to various participatory mechanisms as well as an opportunity to ratify 
their leadership in periodic, albeit single-party, elections.51 Thus, the cost of 
consensus was language broad enough to obscure sharp differences among states on 
the nature of their commitment to democratic rule. The differences between the two 
articulations in the Universal Declaration and ICCPR are interesting. Brad Roth 
explains that:
Article 21 of the Declaration can be read syllogistically to mean that the 
basis of governmental authority is such popular will as has been expressed in 
the elections, whereas non-liberal regimes would prefer it to mean that the 
popular will is (in some abstract sense) the basis of--and therefore expressed 
by--governmental authority, and is also expressed in elections. The Covenant 
version simplifies the matter by leaving undefined the relationship, if any, 
not only between authority and elections, but also between authority and 
participation.52
Tragically, outside of the decolonization context, during the Cold War era, there was 
little international consensus on the requirements of democratic governance beyond 
the general but limited insistence on periodic and genuine elections found in the 
ICCPR and a number of other international legal instruments. As a result, states 
lacked generally accepted criteria by which to judge other states’ compliance with 
substantive democratic principles.53 With the end of the bi-polar ideological 
competition that characterized the Cold War,54 there has been a widely publicized 
shift in the character of public pronouncements about democracy. More states have 
made, through treaty or by means of non-binding but still influential declarations, 
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formal commitments to democratic governance.55 In addition, states, international 
organizations, human rights tribunals, and legal scholars have sought increasingly to 
imbue that commitment with some real content--to move beyond the simple but vague 
commitment to free elections contained in the ICCPR.56
The democracy discourse however remains “straitjacketed” by Article 2(7) of the 
U.N. Charter which prohibits intervention in the “domestic affairs” of other states. 
This Article remains a pillar of the U.N. Charter system and continues to cast a 
shadow over all debates relating to government legitimacy or illegitimacy. 
Accordingly, although many states have joined the promulgation of resolutions and 
declarations proclaiming support for democracy and the right of political 
participation,57 they also stress that each state has the “sovereign right freely to choose 
and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems, whether or not they 
conform to the preferences of other states.”58 Though the international community 
may, under Articles 55 and 56, promote state observance of the right of citizens to 
participate in their governance, there is no clear authority to mandate a particular 
allocation of decision-making power within a sovereign state. In any event, an 
election’s “genuineness,” as referred to by both participation provisions, has no 
obvious criteria. 
In a bid to give the participation provisions content and contour, in December 1988, 
the General Assembly called on the U.N. Human Rights Commission “to consider 
appropriate ways and means of enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of 
periodic and genuine elections,” albeit “in the context of full respect for the 
sovereignty of Member States...” The result adopted by the Economic and Social 
Council in May 1989 was a “framework for future efforts,” the first heading of which 
was “The will of the people expressed through periodic and genuine elections as the 
basis for the authority of government,” a phrase that clears up the above--mentioned 
ambiguity in Article 21 of the Declaration. The document included mention of, inter 
alia, “the right of citizens of a State to change their governmental system through 
appropriate constitutional means,” “the right of candidates to put forward their 
political views, individually and in cooperation with others,” and the need for 
“independent supervision” of elections. Two years later, the General Assembly, with 
only eight dissenting votes, declared “that determining the will of the people requires 
an electoral process that provides an equal opportunity for all citizens to become 
candidates and put forward their political views, individually and in co-operation with 
others...” It nonetheless immediately added the words, “as provided in national 
constitutions and laws,” and further recognized: 
that the efforts of the international community to enhance the effectiveness 
of the principle of periodic and genuine elections shall not call into question 
each State’s sovereign right freely to choose and develop its political, social, 
economic and cultural systems, whether or not they conform to the 
preferences of other states.59
In yet another significant move in the early days of the post-Cold War era, support for 
democracy became increasingly identified with the maintenance of peace and 
security. The reaction to the 29 September 1991 Haitian coup seemed to evidence that 
the norm of popular participation was coming into its own as an international index of 
governmental legitimacy, at least where the international community has already 
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become enmeshed (through the “observer” function) in domestic processes. 
Resolution 917 declared that the obstruction of the restoration of democracy in Haiti 
constituted a threat to peace. By imposing sanctions and authorizing military 
intervention in order to restore democratic rule in Haiti, the Security Council further 
recognized democracy as an entitlement. The Security Council corroborated the claim 
of a population’s right to be governed by those whom they had elected freely, fairly 
and openly. On the adoption of Resolution 940, U.S. Representative to the United 
Nations Madeleine K. Albright stated that the resolution’s objective was “not to 
impinge upon the sovereignty of Haiti, but to restore the power to exercise that 
sovereignty to those who rightfully possessed it and to enable Haiti, in the words of 
the United Nations Charter, to pursue “social progress and better standards of life in 
larger freedom.”60 This echoed the sentiments that had been aired earlier by Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali, the then Secretary-General of the U.N. at the historic Security Council 
Summit Meeting of January 1992.61
The Aristide Government had won an overwhelming victory in internationally 
monitored elections just nine months prior to a coup by an incompetent military 
notorious for human rights abuses and disrespect for democratic processes. In the 
words of Brad Roth: “As the elected leadership remained physically intact, there was 
no contest over the mandate to articulate the will of the ‘legitimate’ government. 
Although the coup leadership had support in the elected legislature and cited human 
rights abuses allegedly encouraged by Aristide, its violent conduct and unsavory 
history belied any claim to be acting on behalf of democracy and human rights.’62
Considering that the concept of popular sovereignty is at the heart of the emerging 
right to restore democracy, Michael Reisman notes that “sovereignty can be violated 
as effectively and ruthlessly by an indigenous as by an outside force, in much the 
same way that the wealth and natural resources of a country can be spoliated as 
thoroughly and efficiently by a native as by a foreigner.”63 Seen in this manner, the 
sovereignty of Haiti was violated when the will of the people, ascertained in open, 
free and fair elections, was thwarted by violent means. In the words of Lois Fielding, 
‘… the right of self-determination signal [ed] “a radical decision that henceforth the 
internal authority of governments would be appraised internationally.” Further, the 
appearance of “criteria for appraising the conformity of internal governance with 
international standards of democracy” was evidence of the rise of popular 
sovereignty.’64
III. Reaping the Fruit: Entrenching Democracy 
The idea of democracy is supported by fundamental instruments of multilateralism. 
The U.N. Charter under Chapter I, Article 1(2), provides that “[t]he Purposes of the 
United Nations are . . . [t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect 
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples …” Other important 
instruments articulating this right are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Universal Declaration 
states: “The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this 
will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal 
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting 
procedures.”65 The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
11
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provide that: “All peoples 
have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.”66
Professor Thomas Franck argues that these documents together with regional 
instruments constitute “a net of participatory entitlements.”67 Commentators note that 
the right to democracy has developed within international agreements. Professor 
Thomas Franck finds that democracy, “while not yet fully word made law, is rapidly 
becoming in our time, a normative rule of the international system.”68 On his part, 
Gregory Fox asserts that “parties to the major human rights conventions have created 
an international law of participatory rights.”69
The assertion that the principle of democracy and the rights which together constitute 
the democratic prerogative are “guaranteed in all comprehensive human rights 
instruments”,70 is not empty rhetoric. Infact the greatest progress in specifying the 
elements of democratic governance has been made in regional systems and, in 
particular, within the O.S.C.E.71 At a 1990 meeting in Copenhagen, for example, 
members of the O.S.C.E. (then referred to as the C.S.C.E.) spelled out some of the 
characteristics of democratic systems and the rule of law.72 This list included: 1) free 
elections; 2) the need for representative government; 3) accountability of the 
executive to an elected legislature or the electorate as a whole; 4) a clear separation 
between the State and political parties; 5) an independent judiciary; 6) military and 
police forces under civilian control; and 7) a panoply of related human rights.73
Importantly, in addition to guaranteeing democratic freedoms to the individual, recent 
instruments view democracy as both a keystone of human rights and a necessary 
condition for international peace and security. Reflecting the proliferation of 
democracies throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Document of Copenhagen commits 
participating states to the individual freedoms of democracy, including free elections, 
representative government, government compliance with law, and separation between 
the State and political parties. The C.S.C.E.’s Charter of Paris pledges to “undertake 
to build, consolidate, and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of 
our nations.”74 In addition to guaranteeing democratic freedoms to every individual, 
the thirty-four participating states proclaimed: “Democracy is the best safeguard of 
freedom of expression, tolerance of all groups of society, and equality of opportunity 
for each person.”75 In the Moscow meeting of the C.S.C.E., participating states 
asserted that “full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the 
development of societies based on pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are 
prerequisites for a lasting order of peace, security, justice and co-operation in 
Europe.”76 Participating states found that “issues relating to human rights, 
fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law are of international concern, as 
respect for these rights and freedoms constitutes one of the foundations of the 
international order.”77
International conferences in the 1990s mirrored the C.S.C.E.’s concerns. The Vienna 
Declaration of the UN World Conference on Human Rights “considers the denial of 
the right of self-determination as a violation of human rights and underlines the 
importance of the effective realization of this right.”78 The participating states 
expressly defined self-determination to include a democratic entitlement, noting that it 
is through self-determination that peoples “freely determine their political status, and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”79 The Vienna 
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Declaration further affirmed that the “World Conference on Human Rights considers 
the denial of the right of self-determination as a violation of human rights and 
underlines the importance of the effective realization of this right.”80 The participating 
states asserted that “[d]emocracy, development and respect for human rights, and 
fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing.” Finally, the 
participating states agreed that “[d]emocracy is based on the freely expressed will of 
the people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and 
their full participation in all aspects of their lives.”81
Regional initiatives together with the U.N. monitoring of elections have clarified the 
substantive meaning of the emerging right to democracy.82 Gregory Fox lists criteria 
gathered from human rights instruments and UN practice in monitoring elections that 
define a free and fair election. These include:
1. periodic elections at reasonable intervals; 
2. a secret ballot; 
3. honesty in vote tabulation; 
4. universal suffrage, with minor exceptions permitted for minors, prisoners, 
the mentally ill, and the like; 
5. an absence of discrimination against voters and candidates; 
6. freedom to organize and join political parties, which must be given equal 
access to the ballot, and an equal opportunity to campaign; 
7. to the extent the government controls the media, the right of all parties to 
present their views through the major media outlets; 
8. supervision of the election by an independent council or commission not 
tied to any party, faction, or individual, whose impartiality is insured in both 
law and practice.”83
Policy trends of actors in the world community have further encouraged democracy as 
a right.84 The United Nations has monitored over thirty elections, including those in 
Namibia, Nicaragua, and Haiti.85 Several Western European nations have attempted to 
withhold aid from those nations that are not democracies. On a regional level, the 
European Community and the United States have imposed on countries, such as the 
former Yugoslavia and the Balkan States, “conditions on recognition” that include a 
commitment to democratic governance.86 Additionally, restoration of democracy and 
the right of self-determination has figured prominently in the lawfulness of military 
action in the southern hemisphere. Today, many countries notably in the Third World 
consider a clean bill of health from foreign electoral observers as an important aspect 
of demonstrating their commitment and adherence to democratic ideals.87
The biggest stumbling block though in the move towards democracy as an entitlement 
is that both within the U.N. and regional organizations there is no special set of 
institutional procedures for handling interruptions in democratic governance, much 
less for addressing undemocratic regimes generally. As a result, any effort to promote 
democracy through the political organs of the U.N. is subject to all the vagaries of 
U.N. politics. The procedures within regional organizations are little better. The 
Moscow and Copenhagen documents commit the member states, morally if not 
legally, to “defend and protect” the “democratic order” in any participating state 
against a violent overthrow.88 But the steps to be taken are not specified, not even to 
the extent of outlining the institutional procedures to be followed to determine what 
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those steps should be. Although one author has argued that the Copenhagen 
Document implicitly authorizes military intervention to protect democracy,89 it seems 
unlikely that the signatories would interpret it this way. 
Despite acknowledgment of democracy as an entitlement there exist minimal 
international and regional procedures for responding to unconstitutional seizures of 
power and flawed elections. Steps to be taken are not specified with regional and 
international efforts constrained by the non-intervention provisions of the U.N. 
Charter90 and continued opposition of states to anything that might open the door too 
widely to intervention in internal affairs. There is simply no consensus, within 
regional and other international organizations, particularly the UN, on strengthening 
significantly their institutional capacity to promote democracy. Any substantial 
departure from present practice must survive the critical scrutiny of veto-wielding 
states such as China and Russia91 as well as potentially hostile regional blocs in the 
Middle East, Asia and Africa. As a result of differences among states, departures from 
democratic principles are likely to prompt a significant collective international 
response by the U.N., only in exceptional circumstances. On rare occasions, as in 
Haiti, it may prove possible for states to agree on collective measures to restore the 
ousted government to power,92 but in general, easy cases of the sort represented by 
Haiti continue to be very few and far between.
However, as the US intervention in Panama shows, the U.S. is not so reluctant, and in 
fact is prepared to act unilaterally, often outside the U.N. dispute resolution 
mechanism, (and in the case of the recent intervention in Iraq, will completely ignore 
the U.N.). The action taken in Haiti was to restore democracy93, and that is something 
far different from what the U.S. sought to achieve in Panama and Iraq, namely to 
create a democracy where none previously existed and what is even more significant 
is the US was prepared to use force to do so. This form of “pro-democratic action” or 
as the current Bush administration has labeled it, “regime change” is a far cry from 
protecting a right to democracy, which is what occurred in Haiti, the action taken in 
Panama and Iraq, is in fact a denial of choice and freedom.94 It is also nothing new.
IV. Pro-Democratic Action: Protecting the Crop?
The right to political participation which provides a platform for intervention in 
matters that have been traditionally regarded as within the domestic jurisdiction of a 
state represents a fundamental departure from classic international law. However, the 
project of democratic governance and pro-democratic action, heralded as a new 
advance in the development of international law (especially in the post-Cold War era), 
has a much older lineage. 
Often forgotten is the intervention in post-World War I Russia in 1919 by the Allies, 
mainly the US and Great Britain. The Allies sought to overthrow the Bolsheviks who 
had risen to power through the Russian Revolution in 1917. The intervention was 
through moral and military support to the “White Russians” opposing the “Red 
Russians” (Bolsheviks). The intervention was justified on the grounds of self-defense 
which afforded a legitimate ground in international law albeit a dubious one in the 
circumstances. The real motive was the fact that the emerging Soviet government 
based on communism “threatened” the capitalist world and sought to negate Western 
liberal-democracy principles as the basis of government. The intervention also 
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presented an opportunity to satisfy Woodrow Wilson’s desire to see self-
determination applied in Russia however this meant only one thing to the West--a 
right to democratic government. In other words though intervention was premised on 
the right of the Russian citizenry to choose a mode of governance, the right of choice 
was negated by the fact that the U.S. and Western European Powers clearly 
discounted Communism as being among the choices.95 Wilson’s idealism and the 
Western European pro-democratic agenda soon fell casualty to isolationism and 
nationalism.
As the U.S. withdrew from the international arena, European States increasingly 
gravitated towards aggressive nationalism. Domestic political institutions (of 
whatever form and character) were seen as essential components of a unique national 
culture which needed to be jealously protected from external pressures. States 
retreated to the fortress--like conception of Westphalian sovereignty which Wilsonian 
idealism had sought to dilute. This retreat effectively reaffirmed the classic 
international law position that governments had an absolute monopoly over 
fundamental internal political decisions, as well as over legislative, executive and 
judicial structures.96 Idealism was shoved to the background and nationalism gained 
ascendance leading to the outbreak of the Second World War. It was against the 
background of sovereign excesses pursued by fascist governments that the 
international community sought to craft a new world order to move the citizenry from 
the periphery to the center of international discourse. Naturally the agenda was firmly 
in the hands of the victorious Allies dominated by states with liberal-democratic 
structures. But the Cold War that set in shortly thereafter was to negate the practice of 
the lofty ideals relating to political participation by the citizenry that were laid down 
in various important UN treaties and resolutions and reaffirmed in various 
international and national declarations and proclamations.
The Cold War shepherded pragmatic pro-democracy discourse away from 
international and regional agendas. A re-invigorated respect for sovereignty, re-
ignited by the nationalistic sentiments of the emerging Third World once again 
prevented international law from scrutinizing or legally assessing the character of the 
government of a state.97 In practice, how the government of a state was conducted, 
particularly in terms of the relationship between government and its citizens 
continued to be largely a matter outside the proper scope of international law98 despite 
the lofty ideals expressed in the U.N. Charter, the UDHR, ICCPR and related 
proclamations. Ironically, democracy was an ideal shared by both the Communist and 
Capitalist blocs. But the substantive and ideological divide was great. Western liberal 
democracy emphasized individualism, self-interest and liberty, and Eastern Socialist 
democracy stressed collectivism and equality. In the shadow of the East/West divide, 
democratic principles provided the framework for diverse popular movements 
producing many different accounts of democracy. The volatile geopolitics of the Cold 
War created fertile ground for covert activity by the two superpowers seeking to 
“spread” their ideologies. At the socio-political level it was essentially a seesaw battle 
of socialism versus Western liberalism.
The covert involvement of the US, the world’s leading and most powerful democracy, 
in the internal affairs of Nicaragua, is a “recent” and noteworthy example99 that bears 
general parallels to the intervention in Russia, albeit against a different geopolitical 
landscape. U.S. involvement in Nicaragua essentially involved support to the Contras-
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-a counter-revolutionary movement.100 The US’s involvement was extensive and 
eventually led to Nicaragua seeking to resolve the matter through the International 
Court of Justice (I.C.J.).101 Although the sole justification offered before the World 
Court by the U.S. was collective self-defense, it is possible that this argument was 
taken even less seriously by the policy’s supporters than by its opponents. Even 
before the matter appeared before the I.C.J., the governmental illegitimacy thesis had 
already been betrayed by the US itself in a report presented by President Reagan to 
Congress on 10 April 1985. The report stated in no uncertain terms that one of the 
changes which the United States was seeking from the Nicaraguan Government was: 
“implementation of Sandinista commitment to the Organization of American States to 
political pluralism, human rights, free elections, non-alignment, and a mixed 
economy”.102 A fuller statement of those views was contained in a formal finding by 
Congress issued by the U.S. Congress three months later on 29 July 1985.103
The political justifications for U.S. policy and action consistently emphasized the 
internal character of the Nicaragua regime, to such an extent that the Court felt 
compelled to address arguments beyond the pleadings. As the Court pointed out, the 
July 29, 1985, finding of the U.S. Congress based support for the Contras on alleged 
Sandinista breaches of “solemn commitments to the Nicaraguan people, the United 
States, and the Organization of American States” regarding democracy and human 
rights.104 Although “advanced solely in a political context” and “not advanced as legal 
arguments,” these contentions prompted the Court to make specific admonitions 
against any principle of “ideological intervention” and any unilateral right of states to 
use force to compel compliance even with legally binding “commitments” regarding 
internal policy.105 The World Court emphatically noted that: 
…it strains belief to suppose that a body formed in armed opposition to the 
Government of Nicaragua, and calling itself the ‘Nicaraguan Democratic 
Force’, [the group supported by the US] intended only to check Nicaraguan 
interference in El Salvador and did not intend to achieve violent change of 
government in Nicaragua.106 [Emphasis added]
The core of the US’s decision to intervene was because the Nicaraguan government 
had decided not to hold elections, in effect reneging on “promises” made earlier: and 
the US had appointed itself as the “guardian” responsible to ensure that these 
“promises” be kept.107 The I.C.J. quite rightly determined that the U.S. action was 
unlawful intervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign nation-state and more 
importantly reaffirmed the right of Nicaragua and indeed, any nation-state to choose 
its political and economic system. In the Court’s candid observation:
The questions as to which the Nicaraguan Government is said to have 
entered into a commitment are questions of domestic policy. The Court 
would not therefore normally consider it appropriate to engage in a 
verification of the truth of assertions of this kind, even assuming that it was 
in a position to do so.  A State’s domestic policy falls within its exclusive 
jurisdiction, provided of course that it does not violate any obligation of 
international law. Every State possesses a fundamental right to choose and 




The finding of the United States Congress also expressed the view that the 
Nicaraguan Government had taken “significant steps towards establishing a 
totalitarian Communist dictatorship”. However the regime in Nicaragua be 
defined, adherence by a State to any particular doctrine does not constitute a 
violation of customary international law; to hold otherwise would make 
nonsense of the fundamental principle of State sovereignty, on which the 
whole of international law rests, and the freedom of choice of the political, 
social, economic and cultural system of a State. Consequently, Nicaragua’s 
domestic policy options, even assuming that they correspond to the description 
given of them by the Congress finding, cannot justify on the legal plane the 
various actions of the Respondent complained of. The Court cannot 
contemplate the creation of a new rule opening up a right of intervention by 
one State against another on the ground that the latter has opted for some 
particular ideology or political system.109 [Emphasis added]
The World Court thus expressed its discomfort with the U.S. endeavors to force a 
political, economic and social system on Nicaragua by restating the fundamental right 
of every State to choose and implement its own socio-political structure. Though 
obiter, the Court’s statement was significant and raises a critical distinction between 
the preference for a democratic government, and proceeding to simply impose one, 
without the consent of the relevant citizenry identified as its beneficiaries. 
While it may be argued that the I.C.J.’s pronouncements in the Nicaragua Case were 
made against the backdrop of the volatile power-politics of the Cold War and thus do 
not reflect the position of the new spirit that accompanied the end of the Cold war, the 
pronouncements were broadly reaffirmed in two post-Cold War U.N. Resolutions 
relating to the matter. Notwithstanding the protective democratic proclamations and 
action plans emerging in the post-Cold War new world order context, the General 
Assembly displayed the great caution mirrored by the I.C.J. Two post-Cold War 
resolutions, which refer to the monitoring of democratic elections, bear this out.110
The first resolution supports international monitoring of elections and stresses the 
indispensability of “periodic and genuine elections” to ensure protection of the 
governed, and identifies “the right of everyone to take part in the government of his or 
her country.”111 The second resolution does not support the international monitoring 
of elections but states:
that it is the concern solely of peoples [of each state] to determine methods 
and to establish institutions regarding the electoral process, as well as to 
determine the ways for its implementation according to their constitutional 
and national legislation ... [urging all states] to respect the principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of States.112
In a comment on the implications of these two resolutions, Professor Dianne Otto 
observes that: 
The incongruity of these resolutions reconfirms the presence of two versions of 
democratic entitlement at international law: one that is restrictive and controlling, and 
another that tentatively takes a stance of openness to different democratic forms. 
Thus, despite the claims by proponents of the new world order, it is possible to 
conclude that the international legal system is not yet fully committed to conservative 
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liberal democracy as the universal democratic form upon which a state's legitimacy is 
founded. However, the grounds for defending such a conclusion are diminishing 
rapidly. The growing emphasis on democratic standardization and enforcement is 
shifting the balance strongly towards the primacy of protective liberal democracy and 
away from any possibility of the legal recognition of democratic diversity.113
Having clarified that the I.C.J.’s Cold War pronouncements were not extinguished nor 
diminished by the spirit of the so-called post-Cold War new world order, the Article 
continues with its discussion of the decision. The I.C.J.’s pronouncements besides 
reaffirming the right of every state to organize its socio-political affairs and structures 
as it deems fit also raised a very fundamental question at the core of the pro-
democratic action argument and the right to democracy. What is the situation if a 
people choose a non-democratic government? Is the international community entitled 
to then intervene and impose one? 114
Whilst it may appear completely unimaginable to a citizen living in the West that 
anyone if given a choice between democratic institutions and non-democratic 
institutions would choose the latter, it is still feasible, and one shouldn’t let cultural 
relativism cloud any conclusions. Martin Wright when commenting on the French 
Revolution wrote that the attempt by revolutionary France to “reorganize world 
society” may have worked if the French had not been so “…sublimely incapable of 
distinguishing between the universal rights of Man and French culture…”.115
Although initially the revolutionaries in France maintained the revolutionary values of 
liberty and equality,116 such altruistic intentions did not last long and soon the French 
used force to impose their ideals upon others, Belgium for example, and then the rest 
of Europe, and so the road to the Napoleonic Empire began.117 Could this also be 
what the U.S. (as the leading democracy proponent and “beacon on the hill”) is 
aiming to achieve with unilateral pro-democratic action? The U.S. has not just 
intervened in Nicaragua and Panama, its extensive history of intervention has 
included military intervention, in Guatemala in 1954; the Dominican Republic in 
1965, Grenada in 1983 and more recently Afghanistan and Iraq.118
The flurry of pro-democratic activity by the West (exemplified in US action owing to 
its capacity and capability for the same) juxtaposed against the French experience 
raises important questions in pro-democracy discourse. This is especially so in light of 
the fact that universalist claims to democracy as an entitlement are characteristic of 
Enlightenment perspectives and just like this perspectives, the push for the democratic 
ideal sweeps aside contention and ignores radical dissent as if it did not exist. As a 
result, the diversity of the democratic tradition is erased by these totalizing assertions 
of unanimity and final truth. 119 It is to be recalled that both George Bush and Mikhail 
Gorbachev greeted the end of the Cold War as the dawning of a new world order. 
From Bush's expansive North American viewpoint, this was the birth of an 
international consensus embracing the great U.S. ideal of freedom for all.120
Australia's Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, approvingly identified the components of 
this global metamorphosis as “the promotion of democratic practices; the 
consolidation of free market economies; collective resistance to aggression; and the 
upholding of 'universal values.' “121 The new world order, according to then U.S. 
President, George Bush Sr and other commentators, is the triumph of liberal 
democracy over communism122  or, in more extreme views, the arrival of the end of 
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history.123 With the ending of the Cold War and the opportunity for the globalization 
of patriarchal and liberal forms of democracy under the banner of a new world order, 
the West seeks to co-opt the international legal system to assist the agenda of Western 
expansionism in the guise of promoting democracy and human rights. The pressure is 
on the international legal system to legitimate these developments, specifically by 
taking a role in standardizing and enforcing world-wide protective liberal democratic 
forms 124 With the U.S. (owing to its immense power and influence) as lead 
proponent, its overt and covert pro-democratic activity raises an important question 
not too far removed from the issues that this article is grappling with:  Is the US 
acting like an empire or more bluntly is it indeed an empire? A positive response to 
that question would appear ironic, since the US was formed through an act of 
rebellion against British Imperialism, but irony is a poor substitute for denial, and 
whilst the U.S. citizen, and indeed the U.S. government may vehemently refuse to 
accept it, the U.S. Empire has existed since Theodore Roosevelt.125 In Ignatieff’s 
eloquent assertion:
True, there are no American colonies and American corporations do not need 
their governments to acquire territory by force in order to acquire new 
markets. So the new empire is not like those of times past, built on colonies 
and conquest. It is an empire lite, hegemony without colonies, a global sphere 
of influence without the burden of direct administration and the risks of daily 
policing…It is an empire, in other words, without consciousness of itself as 
such. But that does not make it any less of an empire, that is, an attempt to 
permanently order the world of states and markets according to its national 
interests.126
Other commentators like Noam Chomsky share Ignatieff’s view, arguing that the 
US’s emergence as the only true super power, after the Second World War (a 
development capped with the crumbling of the Soviet Empire) is evidenced by the 
fact that it “…undertook careful and sophisticated planning to organize the world 
system in its interests.”127 Actions were taken; decisions made, dictators supported, 
human rights abuses ignored, regimes “changed”:128 all so that the US corporations 
and industry had access to new markets, to ensure its manufacturers had access to 
resources particularly petroleum products in the Middle East, to protect its consumer-
based economy. Certainly one of the reasons for the extent of the US intervention in 
Latin America has been to protect US private investment.129 All else, such as the 
championing the right to democracy, to “freedom” from the encroaching Communist 
hordes, was empty rhetoric.130 So extensive was the US interest defined, that any 
nationalist group, any leader, any development of so-called “independent” thought, 
(namely something or someone that would not follow US policy), became demonized 
as an “enemy to freedom” and action was swift to follow.131 One of the motivating 
factors behind the Cold War was to use military spending and the development of the 
industrial--military complex to keep alive a struggling US economy.132 Since the end 
of the Cold War, US military doctrine has shifted to focus on “low intensity conflict”, 
in order to “…project power into other regions and maintain access to distant markets 
and resources.”133 Does this sound like an attempt to organize the international 
community for the sake and benefit of the US and not for the benefit of the world’s 
peoples? Given the nature of the U.S. economy, and the desire expressed above to 
ensure protection of U.S. access to “distant markets”, wouldn’t it make sense to 
ensure that other nations too retained a similar economy?  Thus another explanation 
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for the push by Western liberal democracies for their style of governance to become 
the only style of government is economics. The structure of the U.S. is not so much 
based on liberal democracy but liberal economics. Brad Roth in his article examining 
and evaluating the progress of democracy makes the link between liberalism [freedom 
from interference by the State or the government] and a “market-society” abundantly 
clear.134 As one commentator, a defender of U.S. policy has said:
For 200 years the United States has preserved almost unsullied the original 
ideals of the Enlightenment: the belief in the God-given rights of the 
individual, the inherent rights of free assembly and free speech, the blessings 
of free enterprise, the perfectability of man, and above all, the universality of 
these values.135 [Emphasis added.]
So is it a right to free enterprise rather than human rights that the Western nation-
states are seeking to impose on others, when they support a right to democracy? Or 
perhaps more accurately is it a right of the U.S. to free enterprise and the rest of the 
international community to become modern-day slaves of the US economy and 
corporations?136 Certainly one of the goals argued to be crucial for a successful post-
war reconstruction of Iraq is the introduction of a capitalist economy.137 Further there 
is much support for what is labeled as “neo-colonialism” that is the creation of 
economic dependency upon more advanced, industrial nations, usually in the West.138
According to the theory of neo-colonialism, most Third World nations have 
become dependent on the international economic system dominated by the 
Western… powers and Japan for markets, technology, financing and even 
basic foodstuffs to such a point that these less-developed countries may be 
called “hooked”: they cannot do with their dependence, but, just as well, they 
cannot do without it. They cannot do with dependence because their form of 
incorporation into the international system has tended to preclude 
their industrialization, relegating them instead to the less dynamic forms of 
growth associated with agriculture or the extractive industries.139
Whether economics is the motivating factor behind pro-democratic action would 
require an extensive examination beyond the scope of this present paper. However 
one point can be made with confidence, Western liberal democracies do not impose 
democracy, simply out of altruism, because they believe it is a legal norm or the best 
way to protect human rights,140 but simply because it was and continues to be in 
pursuit of their national self-interests.141 Whenever the right to democracy is argued 
we should remember the famed U.S. State Department official George Kennan, who 
stated in 1948: 
…. We [the American people] need not deceive ourselves that we can afford 
the luxury of altruism and world benefaction. We should cease to talk about 
such vague and unreal objectives as human rights, the raising of living 
standards and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to 
have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by 
idealistic slogans, the better.142 [Emphasis added]
The statement by George Kennan though relating to the U.S. nonetheless captures the 
essence of actions that are mounted by other states (especially Western) in most 
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spheres, and in the context of this Article, in pro-democratic action. Few see the 
international community’s ambivalent approach to pro-democratic intervention as 
optimal. More immediate geostrategic interests often demand that potential 
intervenors tolerate or even support governments that are either undemocratic, or only 
marginally democratic. Of necessity, then, attitudes toward pro-democratic 
intervention are “awkwardly selective.”143 Selectivity may be morally indefensible, 
but politically inescapable. Various suggestions have been made for circumventing 
problems of selectivity, but no hard and fast ideas have yet emerged.144 Though 
governments are generally unwilling to intervene themselves, they are reluctant to let 
others do so for them. The result is that in the rare cases in which intervention is 
authorized, it is effectively delegated to the most interested available actor.145 For 
instance in the Haitian situation, it was the United States and the same pattern has 
been played out in numerous instances. This pattern remains predictable. These actors 
often press for outcomes which are noted as much for their compatibility with the 
actors’ own interests as for their compatibility with universal norms or the specific 
interests of the affected state.146
The question of the role of the U.N. naturally arises from the observation above which 
may be considered cynical. The authors note that despite many facets of the U.N. 
Charter being associated with democratic ideas, recognition of the sovereign equality 
of member states and a commitment to the self-determination of peoples, closer 
examination reveals that these two ideals are considerably qualified by the practice of 
the United Nations. The undemocratic structures of the United Nations rely on the 
assumption that peace is more likely to result from the consolidation of world power 
arrangements than from deepening democracy which would involve challenging 
global inequalities. Other international organizations and processes such as the 
hierarchical and Western-dominated structure of the international economic system 
reflect this assumption. These examples show that, in practice, the goal of democracy 
in international relations is compromised by the United Nations' deference to the 
current distribution of world power among states.
The U.N.’s and for that matter the international community’s reluctance to intervene 
forcefully in states still subject to dictatorial rule may represent a failure of political 
will: a refusal to shoulder the burden of bringing the benefits of democratic 
governance to populations ruled by military thugs and parasitic elites. For others, the 
U.N.’s recent willingness to authorize intervention in Haiti, Rwanda, Somalia, and 
elsewhere represents a revival of western imperialism: a cynical pursuit of western 
economic and strategic interests in the name of universal values. Either way difficult 
choices are presented. Failure to act is condemned but a willingness to act is viewed 
with suspicion. Not surprising this is the result of a lack of definite content and 
contour regarding democracy, and accepted criteria for intervention of any sort.
How is the international community or indeed any national government to interpret 
U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, as a necessary means of achieving a democratic end, or 
as simply another example of the US “restructuring” the world in a manner to protect 
its access to markets and to protect its own national interests?147 How can the 
international community objectively answer such a question? The answer lies in the 
I.C.J.’s judgment in the Nicaragua Case in view of the fact that the ICJ is the pre-
eminent judicial organ of the UN created to prevent conflict, assist the peaceful 
resolution of international disputes and further the ideals of the U.N. system. If the 
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experts of the I.C.J. recognize that there exists a right of nation-states to determine 
their own political system free from outside interference then what right has the US or 
indeed any nation-state to impose by force a democratic government? After all isn’t 
the forcible imposition of democracy “undemocratic”? Essentially if a peoples’ ability 
to exercise their right to self-determination is so restricted that there is only one form 
of economic political system that they can choose; isn’t that a denial of their rights as 
a people? Doesn’t this make a mockery of the whole right to self-determination; isn’t 
this in effect a form of oppression from a foreign and alien power, namely the 
West?148Isn’t this a form of imperialism?
Like a chameleon changing colors, imperialism may be expected to appear in 
different form but with similar consequences. We would be naïve indeed not 
to anticipate that among its chief practitioners may well be some of its former 
victims and most outspoken critics.149
Some may bridle at the suggestion that pro-democratic action is a form of neo-
colonialism, but the similarities with colonialism cannot be denied. In his examination 
of a global history of colonization Marc Ferro noted that whilst there were many 
varied reasons behind the colonial movement: economic imperatives to find markets 
to cater to the new industries as a result of the industrial revolution; because it was an 
inevitable step in the evolution of a Marxist utopia; a chance to cure social ills by the 
forceful expulsion of convicts; as a cheap source of colonial labor; strategic concerns; 
religious crusades; he noted that whatever may have been the original motivation it 
soon became lost as Western societies became convinced of their superiority, and 
when combined with their technical ability, they had the means and the desire to bring 
“civilization”, to colonize.150
That is how it came about that a cultural concept, civilization, and a value 
system came to have specific economic and political function. Not only did 
these countries have to safeguard the right of Europeans to define the meaning 
of civilization – which actually guaranteed their pre-eminence--but the 
protection of this right became, in addition, the moral raison d’etre of the 
conquerors.151
Combined with the theories of “Social Darwinism”, the Western powers did not 
believe their actions to be oppression, but rather a kindness; of performing a noble 
deed: the imperative need to civilize so-called lesser races for the glory of monarch 
and God: a sort of noble crusade or as it has been described, the “White man’s 
burden”.
In his great goodness the white man does not destroy the inferior species. He 
educates them, unless they are deemed to be not “human”, like the Bushmen 
or the aborigines of Australia who were not even given a name--in which case, 
he exterminates them.152
The implications of imposing protective Western democratic forms as a condition of 
the recognition of a state at international law are far-reaching and it is not an idle 
argument that it creates new opportunities for Western imperialism, despite the bold 
claim made by Professor Thomas Franck that people almost everywhere now demand 
that government be validated by a western-style parliamentary, multiparty, democratic 
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process ... Very few argue that parliamentary democracy is a western illusion and a 
neo-colonialist trap for unwary Third World peoples.153 Criticizing this sweeping 
claim, Professor Dianne notes that “Franck assumes a world consensus about the 
liberal democratic form. Further, he asserts that the foundation for this global 
development lies in the U.S. Declaration of Independence.”154 Professor Otto further 
notes that Professor Franck’s sweeping assertion is shared by other international 
commentators as well.155 Reacting to this holistic position, Professor Otto points out 
that  “[s]uch assertions generalize democratic experience and silence the knowledge 
produced by the many democratic movements which would decry such origins and 
associations.”156 While admitting that Professor Franck and similarly minded 
commentators represent a strong and well-reasoned viewpoint, nonetheless, the  
authors share Professor Otto’s cautionary sentiment which counters the self-righteous 
tenor of Professor Franck and other commentators. It is this self-righteous tenor in the 
democratic discourse that contributes greatly to stifling any debate regarding 
democratic diversity and communality.
Another contentious ground is the issue of pro-democratic action as a form of neo-
colonialism. One argument against classifying pro-democratic action as a form of 
neo-colonialism as espoused by some proponents of the right to democracy is the 
universal nature of the right. Professor Dianne Otto in a critique of this position 
observes that though international legal discourse has developed democratic 
conceptions in human rights law and some support for expansive versions of 
democracy may be found in human rights instruments, this support is confined in 
practice, however, by an overriding emphasis on policing formal electoral and voting 
processes rather than on promoting more flexible and participatory forms of 
democracy.157  She further avers that the dominance by liberalism, conceives of 
human rights in universal and essentialist terms resulting in a Western-centric 
domination of democracy discourse.158  Rounding up her observation, she tersely 
asserts that
From a critical legal studies perspective, the emphasis in liberal rights 
discourse on individualized and formalistic rights results in indeterminate 
and malleable constructions of human rights that create impediments to 
progressive social change by abstracting and atomizing human experience.159
The next section of this Article ventures into the murkiness of the democratic ideal as 
a universal right questioning this position through a discussion of political armies and 
the issue of economic factors. Proposals by democracy’s proponents to standardize 
and centrally monitor the procedures of global democratic change constitute an 
attempt to control and homogenize democratic developments. This need to control is 
consistent with protective forms of liberal democracy. It is a defensive response to 
developments that have the potential to alter the inequitable global distribution of 
power and to involve people, as collectives and individuals, in processes of self-
determination within and beyond the boundaries of states. The authors are well aware 
that this matter is intricate and complex, but their modest aim is to put the question 
mark to what might be termed as an accepted position or the only desirable position.
VI: The Nature of the Democratic Ideal: Is it a Universal Crop?
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Many of the features of Western democracy are so familiar through endorsement at 
the international and regional levels that it is tempting to see them as universal. 
However this whilst true, nevertheless does not discount certain bases unique to 
individual states that create room for suspicion. If Western democratic principles are 
becoming universal, then it is largely due to the pervasive influence of Western values 
and ideas throughout the world, and the influence of the global economy. The sticking 
point is the apparent inflexibility by the West to allow these values to be affected (in a 
positive) manner by the values of other socio-political orders. Fearing to kindle 
(negatively) the idea of relativism, Western democracy sets up barriers of 
righteousness, binds nations by an appeal to universality and points to the good faith 
and benevolence of liberal-democracy. The threat and fear of international 
ostracization is not the best way to go about advancing the democratic agenda. 
Regimes that are oppressive may need to be replaced:  
… but as the history of France after the French Revolution demonstrated, the 
danger of despising all that had gone before, and starting afresh, is that for 
generations afterwards a society may stagger from one constitutional 
experiment to another, with much violence and bloodshed in its path.160
The wholesome abandonment of traditions cuts a society loose from its moorings. 
Democracy stands to gain from being located within the general socio-political 
landscape of a nation rather than being seen as a wholesale export of the West, which 
prescribes a Western specific template. The sense of ownership by a citizenry in a 
new political architecture contributes immensely to its support: “A monocultural 
tradition may successfully adapt itself to cultural pluralism only if it avoids lapsing 
into moral relativism.”161
When discussing the plans to create a democracy within Iraq, Adeed and Karen 
Dawisha argued that the “…success or failure of democracy in Iraq will depend on 
whether the country’s new political institutions take into consideration its unique 
social and communal makeup.”162 And later: “Restructuring Iraq’s political system 
will be laden with difficulties, but it will certainly be feasible. At the same time, the 
blueprint for Iraq’s democracy must reflect the unique features of Iraqi society.”163 As 
the authors recognize “one size doesn’t fit all, but the same design can fit all with 
necessary adjustments”! Thus their recommendations include the need to recognize 
Iraq’s diversity of religions, cultures and ethnic groups. As such “…the trick is to 
work out a constitutional arrangement that makes sense of Iraq’s social and cultural 
mosaic, transforming diversity into an agent for positive change.” 164Their 
recommendations include a return to constitutional monarchy, retaining the current 18 
administrative units rather than adopt a religious or ethnic based federal model (in 
other words denying the Kurds and Shiites a right to autonomy), a role for the clergy 
and former middle level members of the Baath party, and a reduced state 
bureaucracy.165Most importantly the authors recommend that: “For the sake of all 
parties involved, the American endeavor in Iraq must not end in a more agreeable 
form of dictatorship or a successor regime that promises nothing beyond greater 
cooperation with Washington.”166 There must be a genuine commitment by 
governments. Where democracy is seen mainly as a fad, and an avenue to cordial 
relations with donors, it loses its spirit. 
24
Who is to say that Western democracy is the only form of democracy? The 
ideological competitors of liberal democracy do not after all, deny the role of popular 
will as the basis of governmental authority; the often-used terms “people’s 
democracy” and “socialist democracy” are affirmations of fidelity to this notion, the 
revolutionary struggle (in some way or another) being the ultimate embodiment of the 
popular will. As Jorge Dominquez summarized the Cuban Government’s view: 
“[r]evolutionary rule is not legitimated by voting; rather, an election is legitimated by 
revolutionary rule.”167 This is not a barren argument. Article 21 of the Universal 
Declaration after all can be read syllogistically to mean that the basis of governmental 
authority is such popular will as has been expressed in the elections. Whereas non-
liberal regimes would prefer it to mean that the popular will is (in some abstract 
sense) the basis of--and therefore expressed by--governmental authority, and is also 
expressed in elections. The Covenant version simplifies the matter by leaving 
undefined the relationship, if any, not only between authority and elections, but also 
between authority and participation.168
It is of importance that democracy even in Western Europe and the US was by no 
means a constant and consistent development.169 In Europe it experienced upheavals 
generated by socio-political and economic factors--interrupted as it was by the Roman 
Republic which became the Roman Empire, then the Dark Ages, and the odd war 
such as the Peloponnesian War, the English Civil War, the French Revolution, the 
American Revolution, the American Civil War and the Napoleonic Wars, and the odd 
totalitarian regime too, such as Oliver Cromwell’s reign in England,170 and the odd 
abuse of human rights such as the repression of the Scottish Highlands after the battle 
of Culloden,171  and the more recent excesses of the former European colonial 
overlords. 172
On May 8, 1945, the very day Paris was celebrating the defeat of Germany, 
Muslim riots around the town of Setif in Western Algeria claimed over a 
hundred European lives. Reaction was swift. French planes strafed forty-four 
Muslim hamlets, a cruiser offshore bombarded more, and groups of settler 
vigilantes summarily executed hundreds of natives. As testimony to the 
ferocity of the repression, how many Muslims died in these events has never 
been determined, though estimates range from 6,000 to 45,000.173
As one commentator notes Western liberal democracy may not appeal to every citizen 
in the global community, simply because they do not cherish the West’s idealized 
version of private life, the protection of individualism and consumerism. Instead they 
may desire to become part of something “bigger than themselves”; to “mould the 
world anew”: to become part of destiny or history.174 In other words Western 
liberalism is insufficient to satisfy the urge, which he argues is so common and 
prevalent in the human psychic, of belonging to something grand, some historical 
moment, some dynamic and apparently benevolent movement. 
Nothing that humans experience can compare with the intoxication which 
comes from feeling oneself to be part of some great heave of history, from an 
awareness that the whole community is on the move. It was what the French 
felt during the Napoleonic period, the Germans before the First World War 
and still more so under the Nazis, many Russians even under the tyranny of 
Joseph Stalin, the Iranians in the initial phase of their Islamic republic.175
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This desire is clearly evident in religious crusades or jihad, and in revolutions, and 
will prevent the adoption of democracy, particularly by a group that has become 
alienated by a lack of political or economic power.  And as the example of the success 
that the Nazi party and fascism had in post-war Germany, such movements can infect 
an entire people and sweep away all thoughts of Western liberalism. This is perhaps 
one of the most important and overlooked reasons why democracies fail. Many 
societies and peoples do not share the belief that with democracy comes freedom, or 
that it will simply improve their lot in life. But there are certainly many examples, 
such as in the former U.S.S.R., where a change to democracy has had the opposite 
effect a worsening of the economy and living standards of a vast proportion of a 
people.176
The breakdown of an economy, or worse of society as a whole has in the past led to 
the creation of political armies, where the general population is panicked into a frantic 
search for any entity that will create stability, national cohesion, and security. Political 
armies have been defined as those military forces that “…consider involvement in- or 
control over- domestic politics and the business of government to be part of their 
legitimate function.”177 As such political armies are the nemesis of democratic 
governance, since it is accepted that the central indicator of democratic government is 
civil political institutions and processes based on the consent of the people secured 
through their participation in free and fair elections managed by civil institutions 
rather than the stereotypic tinderbox socio-political landscape that military dominance 
is built on that seems to ensure elections of flee and flare. A nation under military rule 
has always been presented as the classic prima facie case of undemocratic rule. Thus 
the premise that flows from this assumption negates any form of military involvement 
in governance. The army should be a neutral institution of the State falling within the 
discipline of those whom the ballot has ordained, but armies often venture into the 
political arena, frequently justifying their actions to be necessary to counter such 
dangers as collapse, or social disintegration and the proliferation of violent conflict. 
How does a “vice” give rise to a “virtue”?178
While generally political armies meddle in governance whether directly or indirectly 
to the chagrin of the citizenry, this is half the story. In some countries their 
interference in governance is actually condoned. The armed forces with its inherent 
nationalism and organization will always appear to be the entity to restore a 
breakdown in law and order and guarantee it when a nation falls into anarchy and 
chaos (whether this be reflected in armed conflict or serious civil unrest). 
Maintenance of law and order is seen as a prerequisite to providing the necessary 
conducive environment for society to further socio-political and economic agendas. 
But then, often once the army leaves the barracks for the streets, it frequently heads to 
the presidential palace. One such series of examples can be found in the 1930’s in 
Latin America where the middle class was not ‘strong enough to fill the gap left by 
the breakdown of oligarchic hegemony “… and this led to a ‘middle class military 
coup.”179 There are many other examples, such as the coups by the Turkish 
military,180 Pakistan and the bloody takeover in Algeria181. In his televised address to 
the nation on 13 October 1999, justifying the military coup in Pakistan, General 
Pervez Musharraf mentioned the turmoil and uncertainty in the country and a 
crumbling economy due to the self-serving policies of individuals wielding influence 
in government, factors that were rocking the foundations of the nation.182
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…My singular concern has been the well being of our country alone. This has 
been the sole reason that the army has willingly offered its services for nation-
building tasks, the results of which have already been judged by you. All my 
efforts and counsel to the government it seems were to no avail. Instead they 
now turned their attention on the army itself. Despite all my advice they tried 
to interfere with the armed forces, the last remaining viable institution in 
which all of you take so much pride and look up to, at all times, for the 
stability, unity and integrity of our beloved country.183
Similar language was used by one of Turkey’s most revered figures Kemal Ataturk, 
eight decades earlier when describing the situation of the Ottoman Empire in 
September 1917. The military hero emerged as a charismatic leader of the Turkish 
national liberation struggle in 1919, creating the modern state of Turkey where even 
today the armed forces are a good example of a political army.184
When there is an incredibly strong identification of the army with the domestic fate of 
the nation,185 the dynamics change. The armed forces become involved in “nation-
building”.186 The danger is that the conservative nature of military forces world-wide, 
the very factor that people hope will bring about stability, is also the very factor that 
can prevent the army from relinquishing control, as eventually the armed forces see 
any development or any political devolution of power that is not subject to their 
control as being a potential threat to stability: thus preventing the return to civil 
society and more importantly to savage human rights abuse.
These features [systematic abuse of human rights abuse, corrupt or 
unaccountable governments] seem to prevail under political armies. Close 
control of politics and the state by an institution built on hierarchy, the chain 
of command, monothetic ideology and deployment of the means of coercion is 
liable to fall short of the requirements of good governance. Political armies 
may quickly see political party competition as instability, public policy 
deliberations as inefficiency, and opposition to the established power 
hierarchy as dissent or even treason towards the state and the nation. The 
application of an uncontested military logic to politics in dealing with such 
perceived flaws and problems has in many cases produced the abject kind of 
dictatorship that excels in internal warfare, state terrorism, and murky 
politics.187
Even when the military return power back to a civil administration, there is no 
guarantee that they will not seize it again, particularly if their interests or position is 
threatened or again if they believe that the civil administration is adopting a course of 
action, which in the army’s opinion will to catastrophic consequences for the nation.  
… even in countries in which the military have now returned to the barracks as 
part of the reassertion of civilian politics, current societal problems still make 
the consolidation of democratic governance an uncertain endeavor. Is it not 
possible that, if real or perceived threats to the social or political integrity of 
the nation are sufficiently strong, a reversal may take place that would bring 
the military back into politics, even to the point of again assuming direct 
control of government?188
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Economic stability and prosperity does play a role in keeping the army at bay by 
preventing social chaos and political anarchy by incensed masses. After all a fair 
share of revolutions have been spawned by this very factor where the wealth and 
benefits of the community are restricted to elites as a nation progresses. But tied up to 
the issue economic factor is the assertion of the authors that imposition of democracy 
will not succeed if it does not create an economic system that encourages and allows 
for class transition from poverty to wealth, something which a healthy middle class 
represents. Thus to impose a democratic government upon a community that is 
economically unprepared for it, poses the risk that the community will slide into 
anarchy or despotism: and that is the true danger of pro-democratic action.189 A good 
starting point would be the following observation:
Britain’s progress towards democracy was spurred by an entrepreneurial 
middle class largely independent of the state. In Germany, the economy was 
much more closely connected to the government, and the industrialization of 
the country occurred as a result of the alliance between the state and the 
traditional elites. There was no robust middle class to agitate for greater 
freedoms and representation.190
Kaplan contends that democracy will not succeed unless a “middle class” develops:191
“As almost all political theorists agree, a fully developed middle class is essential to 
an effective and sustainable democracy.”192 Discussing the evolution of a nation-state 
and nationalism, Porter like Kaplan, places a great deal of emphasis on the importance 
of “rising urban class” or a middle class and its role in establishing a stable political 
community. 
The expansion of trade and industry, the development of communications, the 
drift from the countryside to the towns, all made for the growth of a middle 
class which increasingly chafed at the multiplicity of customs barriers and 
other feudal restrictions, and which aspired to political influence 
commensurate with its economic strength and educational attainments.193
In fact it could be argued that even the form in which the middle class takes shape is 
important for the adoption of a democracy. The middle class’s development and 
success must not be linked to or even be a result of state-orchestrated client-patron 
processes that artificially create class stratifications. It must be independent otherwise 
a totalitarian style state is likely to evolve, Iraq is one such example.194 Since financial 
success is linked to the state then the state must survive at all costs, thus individuals 
and the class of persons within a community that retain the most economic and 
political power, rather than seek political pluralism and true democracy through open 
and fair elections, seek to create a system whereby there is only the state, and that 
means one party: thus establishing the potential for human rights abuses. 
Kaplan’s comparison of the unemployment and civil unrest in the imposed democratic 
regimes in Germany and Italy during the inter-war years with the Sudan,195
strengthens the assertion that the economic environment plays a role in shaping 
governance. Explaining further, Kaplan contends that that the violent consequences of 
the failed democracies in Sudan and other communities was due to many citizens of 
these communities do not get the opportunity to see or share in the benefits of a 
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Western-style parliamentary system, since they are locked in a cycle of poverty and 
crime:196 a phenomenon, which is at the core of the rise of terrorist organizations, and 
is also present in many conflicts such as between Palestine and Israel.197 Whilst it is 
too simplistic to argue that history repeats itself, there is certainly a lot to be said for 
ignoring its lessons.
History is littered with examples of failed democracies, the current crisis in the 
Solomon Islands is the most recent198, but it is the collapse of the Weimar Republic in 
1932 that proponents of pro-democratic action would do well to remember and take 
heed, since history is littered with the bitter consequences of that failure: Auschwitz, 
Dachau, the use of nuclear weapons, millions dead; a world left in ruins. Kaplan notes 
that when democracies fail, they do so in a horrific fashion, often being replaced by 
authoritarian regimes far worse than any that may have preceded them, and resulting 
in massive human rights abuses. Totalitarian regimes like those of Adolf Hitler and 
Mussolini came to power through democracy.199 Cambodia’s experiment with 
democracy ended in Hun Sen’s coup.200 Democracy in Sudan led to anarchy that led 
to a terrifying and brutal military regime and civil war. The US sponsored democracy 
in the 1990’s in Afghanistan led to the rise of the Taliban. The failure of the US to 
create a multi-party system in Kurdistan created a power vacuum filled by Saddam 
Hussein, who later used chemical weapons against Iraqi Kurds: and who can forget 
the failure of democracy and a multi-party system in Rwanda?201
It is also true that there have been “successes” such as the creation of West Germany 
in the aftermath of the Second World War, but we must ask ourselves is it worth 
taking the risk?  Does the “end justify the means”? Or will the fruit of the West’s 
endeavors taste bittersweet?
VII. Democracy: Is the Fruit of our Labors as Sweet as We Believe?
Many commentators believe that one explanation for the preference for a democratic
government is that the very nature of democracy with its inherent system of checks 
and balances,202 ensures protection of human rights,203 and thus democratic 
governments are considered less likely to lead to excesses of authority in their 
dealings with their citizens.204 Franck also argues that there are mutual benefits to 
both those that govern and the governed, in a system where there is habitual voluntary 
obedience.205 The government by obtaining the consent of the governed is crucial in 
obtaining “validation” of their governance and political system within the 
international community.206 However for others the answer is more obvious. 
Democratic governments enable some input from those that are governed.207
According to Dasgupta and Maskin, democracy provides “political competition.” 
Competition in the political sphere not only enables citizens to shop among 
contenders to govern, it also enables them to shop for ideas on governance. 
Pluralism in the political domain is akin to competition in the market place. 
Competition is desirable even in an unchanging environment: it discourages 
inefficacy. Competition is necessary to keep incumbents from slacking.208
So if a government is oppressive, autocratic, or simply disliked, its mandate to govern 
is revoked by an election, not by guns and violence: something that cannot be 
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achieved in a dictatorship, regardless of how benevolent it happens to be.209 In 
summary a democratic government by involving, enfranchising and more importantly, 
seemingly to protect the very people that it rules, guarantees its own viability and 
existence, thus assisting it to outlast competing political systems such as communism, 
dictatorships and totalitarianism. Democracy’s ascendancy over other competing 
political systems appears to many to be so comprehensive as to be irreversible: or in 
the words of one commentator a sign of “the end of history”.210
As powerful and persuasive as such arguments may be, they require further 
examination. Looking at the history of democracy’s traditional strongholds--the West-
-few of the countries can claim no skeletons in the closet. Many in the past have had 
shameful practices that were given the imprimatur of the law and supported by 
government institutions. One need only take a cursory look at say the US which has 
espoused democratic ideals from day one of its creation to see that in yesteryears 
universal suffrage or freedom from discrimination was very much present, unless of 
course you were “disabled” by gender or color then the dynamics changed.211
Discrimination and human rights breaches continue in the US today and has not been 
restricted to the US alone.212 In 1902 the newly created Federal Parliament of 
Australia denied all indigenous Australians the right to vote, and it was not until 1962 
that all indigenous Australians received the right to vote in Federal Elections.213 Other 
examples of human rights breaches include massacres of indigenous peoples such as 
Australian Aborigines,214 or US Indians,215 and also the actions of Western 
governments during conflicts such as the British government’s policy during the Boer 
War of interning Boer civilians in camps that a later conflict would have described as 
“concentration camps”. There are modern examples too, Columbian drug traffickers 
have been trained by Western and Israeli personnel,216and Cuba has suffered terribly 
at the hands of US trade embargoes.217
Democracy while a tested and proven concept is still not the ultimate solution to all 
oppressive government and all repressive internal practices.
Democracy is hardly a panacea, and it will not by itself either resolve 
profound domestic problems (such as wide inequalities in income, severe 
ethnic conflicts, and insufficient resources to meet rising demands) or 
necessarily generate an international order that is more peaceful or 
prosperous.218
Certainly democracy has not brought economic prosperity to many Latin American 
nations like Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and more recently Peru, where the holding 
of fair and free elections, have not halted corruption, inflation or economic decline. 
Even after democracy was restored to Haiti, it did not restore stability or prevent 
famine.219 This phenomenon is not restricted to Latin America alone, democratic 
Russia remains impoverished, so to Albania, and so to do parts of India, the world’s 
largest democracy India, where states like Bihar remain in virtual semi-anarchy and 
economic chaos.220 In fact there are numerous examples where non-democratic 
authoritarian regimes have been more successful in promoting successful economic 
reform than their democratic counterparts.221
Contrary to what some have argued above,222 democracy and the electoral process do 
not guarantee protection of human rights as the internees in Guantamao Bay have 
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discovered.223 Kaplan notes that in Bosnia ‘…democracy legitimized the worst war 
crimes in Europe since the Nazi era.’224 In Mali, as Kaplan notes, a so-called 
“democratic success story”, elections were marred by riots and murder.225 Chomsky 
estimates that the US is either directly or indirectly responsible for the deaths of 
approximately 200,000 people in Central America during the 1980’s.226 As the author 
notes in a subsequent work, this figure places Libya’s human rights breaches into
perspective.227 Who can forget the images of ranks of South Korean Riot Police, 
looking like the evil “storm-troopers” from the science fiction film Star Wars, 
clashing with student protestors, almost a signature image of South Korea during the 
1980’s: who can forget Bloody Sunday in Northern Ireland?228
Another issue that confronts democracy is the need to ensure that it does not turn a 
multiethnic nation into a majoritarian dictatorship. Where the minority are effectively 
sidelined from actively participating in government despite their ability to vote by a 
majority whose dominance in government, and thus affairs of the State is guaranteed 
by the ballot. Not an idle argument in multi-ethnic states. One need only look to 
Africa to see the effect of the straight application of one person, one vote in 
heterogeneous states dominated by one or two communities. Generally speaking, the 
threat of human rights abuses is particularly high in territories where there is an ethnic 
minority. An ethnic minority can remain under threat from a majority, despite the 
existence of an electoral process since it is likely that “…the will of the majority will 
simply reflect the position of the most numerous ethnic group within the territory.”229
So an ethnic minority can be repressed or subject to discriminatory processes in a 
democratic system, or rather in spite of the appearance of political empowerment 
created by the electoral process, and this can lead to an escalation of ethnic violence. 
Commentators conveniently forget that the Former Republic of Yugoslavia was a 
democracy before and during its descent into darkness.230
The inability of a particular ethnic group to control political events which 
affect it is unlikely to result in dissatisfaction amongst the members of that 
group; that dissatisfaction may in some cases be so extreme as to induce the 
group to secede and form a nation-state of its own, in which it can control 
political events. This is what happened in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia 
when a democratic system was introduced. The exercise of popular 
sovereignty within those multi-ethnic states led to political fragmentation.231
It could be argued that such examples, involved governments that are/were not “true 
democracies” or were merely “isolated” examples.232 Such an argument is too 
simplistic and often fails to make a thorough historical examination, since it avoids 
many inconvenient questions such as which nation-states have been constantly 
involved both directly and indirectly in military conflict since the end of the Second 
World War-why the US and Israel: two democracies.233 How many civilians, 
Lebanese as well as Palestinians have been killed by Israel?234 In India, the world’s 
largest democracy, “communal” violence between Hindu and Muslim factions in 
Godhra, Gujurat in 2002, has resulted in at least 2,000 civilians being killed.235
Human Rights Watch in a report revealed that there is evidence of complicity in the 
killings of Muslims by the Hindu-dominated State government.236 The Gujarat State 
government has been criticized by India’s own National human Rights Commission, 
for failing to stop the communal violence, and subsequent investigations by Indian 
human Rights’ Activists have revealed that senior ministers form Gujarat’s Chief 
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Minister Modi’s cabinet have been involved in planning attacks against Muslims. 
There were at least 40 such attacks during 2002. And it appears that State authorities 
are not prosecuting those responsible in what could be one of the worse ‘cover-ups’ In 
Indian history.237
Finally, what sort of democracy is to be imposed? This is not begging the question. In 
Algeria during the electoral campaign of April 1999, the army’s intelligence 
department known as Military Security organized the elections. Any candidates who 
opposed the role of the army or would in the army’s opinion be unable to win an 
election were denied the right to run for the elections, thus creating a very noticeable 
lack of opposition candidates. This was resolved by the ‘selection’ of candidates who 
would not jeopardize the military’s grasp on power. In return loyal individuals were 
given selected ministerial positions.238 Clearly this is not a true democracy, would a 
Western model be more appropriate? 
The trends in the West--the cradle of democracy--are alarming. A pattern of electoral
success in elections being dependent upon wealth and a generous expenditure of the 
same is emerging. Leading the way is democracy’s most vigorous proponent and 
defender--the US. In 1996 a grand total of US $2.2 billion was spent on federal 
elections in the US.239 A total of US $499 million was spent by the candidates on the 
elections for the US Congress, and US $341 million was spent on the Senate elections. 
The average Senate seat “cost” the bargain price of US$4.7 million. In 1998 eighteen 
non-incumbent candidates were millionaires, four worth more than US $50 million. In 
1996, 92% of the seats in the US House of Representatives and 88% in the Senate 
were won by those who spent the most money; in 1998 the figures rose to 96% of the 
House and 91 % of the Senate.240 Whilst there are reassuring examples of candidates 
of “modest means” winning elections over wealthy candidates, the sad reality is that 
in the US democratic system, money does make a difference; money buys elections, 
being a millionaire provides considerable assistance.241
Perhaps the US is an example of a democracy gone mad, but the nasty contagion that 
links money almost directly to electoral office is evident in lesser but nevertheless 
worrying proportions throughout Western Europe and naturally is spreading to the 
eager “pupils” in the developing world where ministerial cabinets frequently reflect 
the moneyed list. Naturally, the citizenry in the developing world will come off 
second best. Most are desperately poor, largely illiterate and ignorant of the fact that 
the dollar given the day before by a campaign agent does not bind them morally or 
legally to vote for the particular candidate. Before the masses in the developing world 
have even been able to grapple with democratic tenets, poor civic education has seen 
to it that their votes are already mortgaged to “machine politics”.
Money is distorting democracy now. Money not only determines who wins, 
but often who runs. If you’ve got a good idea and $10,000 and I’ve got a 
terrible idea and $1 million, I can convince people that the terrible idea is a 
good one.242
Is this the type of democracy the West seeks to impose on other communities? A 
process that is a corruption of the very nature of democracy; representative 
government, since the representatives are from one specific socio-economic class (the 
others can simply not afford it) or are sponsored by members of one socio-economic 
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class, with all the obligations such sponsorship creates, then how can such a 
government claim to be a “government by the people for the people”? To impose such 
a system on already impoverished nation-states such as say Iraq does not bode well 
for the longevity of a democratic government, since nothing much will change for the 
impoverished class, they remain sunk in poverty, powerless and alienated. In other 
words there is no development of a middle class, merely a change in ruling elites. 
Segments of the community remain disenfranchised from the benefits of Western 
liberalism, but can see how others maintain their position and therefore ensure they 
will not be denied these benefits.  Such alienation must be all the bitter, when one of 
the reasons given to impose democracy is to deliver a people from evil. At least under 
a totalitarian regime, there are no illusions of freedom or justice. 
VIII. Conclusion
At the international level support for democracy is still expressed in general terms. 
Most important, there has been relatively broad (though by no means uniform) 
acceptance of the principle that elections should entail competition among multiple 
political parties--something Soviet-bloc states rejected for years.243 Additionally, 
substantial international agreement now exists on many of the procedural and 
substantive prerequisites for free and fair elections.244 Elections, however, are only 
part of any democratic system.245 They may assist in the formation of a government 
responsive to the popular will, but they do not guarantee such a government.246 More 
importantly they do not guarantee “good governance” and freedom from human rights 
abuses.
As yet, no international consensus exists on clear-cut criteria that should be used to 
judge whether or not a particular government is substantively “democratic.”247 In part, 
this is because many states still do not share the West’s enthusiasm for liberal, 
parliamentary democracy. Some states, in particular Islamic and Asian states, view 
much of the recent rhetoric about democratic governance as a misplaced attempt to 
transplant Western institutions and structures of governance to countries with 
radically different cultural and political traditions.248 In their view, any attempt to 
impose a Western blueprint for democracy constitutes nothing short of cultural 
imperialism.249 Accordingly, although many such states have joined halfheartedly in 
the promulgation of resolutions and declarations proclaiming support for democracy 
and the right of political participation,250 they also stress that each state has the 
“sovereign right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and 
cultural systems, whether or not they conform to the preferences of other states.”251
The civilizing mission that marked the age of imperialism became entrenched as a 
fundamental aspect of international law and still continues to lurk in the shadows of 
the contemporary international system in a number of different ways, despite radical 
changes. What is remarkable is that despite changes which, in the conventional 
history of international law mark important turning points, the basic structure of the 
civilizing mission is reproduced: government in non-European states is wanting; the 
essential characteristic of good government is government that reflects Eurocentric 
features and thus both the need for detailed “international” standards developed to 
ensure that “good government” is achieved but under laid with less than altruistic 
motives.
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It is unquestionable that the citizenry in the developing world suffer enormous 
hardships and difficulties, as a result, very often, of the corrupt and oppressive Third 
World state.252 But what must be questioned in the narratives that support 
international initiatives such as democracy is the world view that suggests, for 
example, that the causes of oppression are entirely indigenous and that they may be 
alleviated by the redeeming and neutral mechanism of universalized norms.253 ‘Real 
democracy’ involves a complex relationship between the government and the 
governed. Direct replication of successful Western models does not necessarily result 
in successful transplants. For democracy to “work” it must evolve at pace of the 
specific community rather than be imposed from above by a third party. This crucial 
point has been overlooked by many proponents of the right to democracy, but has 
been recognized by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. In his recent report to the 
UN Security Council regarding the democratization crusade in Iraq, drawing on 
various sentiments from different quarters and especially from the general sentiment 
of the Iraqi citizenry, the UN Secretary-General candidly observes:
A common theme was that democracy should not be imposed from the 
outside; it had to come from within. Iraqi political, religious and civic leaders 
are currently reflecting on an Iraqi-led transition agenda.254
An imposition of democracy creates the perception of Western, in particular US 
imperialism, rather than promote the concept of good governance. Good governance, 
respect for civil liberty and separation of powers is at the heart of the right to 
democracy, not necessarily a particular model of government be it a bicameral 
legislature or an executive Prime Minister. The danger of not allowing democracy to 
evolve creates the risk that the democracy will collapse into anarchy as in many of the 
previously cited examples, or into a totalitarian regime with massive human rights 
abuses, or simply a society dominated by political armies. Political armies happen to 
represent a central problem to the democracy crusade, and as the situation in Turkey, 
and Algeria show, political armies once they have become associated with the future 
of the nation, can be very difficult to remove.
The question is then: how to find a middle path between prevalent authoritarian 
political systems on the one hand, and potentially harmful international initiatives 
narrowly focused on appearances rather than substance? It is not overly simplistic to 
say that to transfer Western-Liberal democracy lock, stock and barrel to the 
developing world or other “infant” democracies for that matter is problematic. The 
fact is that this now “universalized” system grew in content and configuration in 
Western societies shaped by occasions during a long course of centuries and reflected 
certain distinct values that are a product of its history of class compromises over 
centuries reflecting peculiar society-centric values. To impose this without limitation 
or restraint on “infant” democracies is to displace positive established socio-cultural 
structures with the result that in some cases the prevailing landscape becomes 
confused or contradictory. Often in blindly following new constitutional orders, 
“infant” democracies lose initiative to other equally needed political and 
administrative reforms that are just as essential to the success of democracy. 
Democracy’s history is clear-it is the most successful of the many political systems of 
government but it must not be forgotten that among the rank and file of European 
countries, democracy is not a monolithic concept. Different countries have modified, 
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refined and institutionalized various forms of the basic concept in concert with local 
realties and requirements. Even where in some Western European constitutions there 
appears to be an enshrinement of one form or another of constitutional dictatorship-
democracy prevails simply because the necessary mechanisms exist to curb extensive 
state power inherent in all forms of government be they democratic or autocratic. It is 
not State power that is the issue, it is the use of that power by government that is the 
issue. We should bear in mind the admonition of Winston Churchill famed British 
political and statesman:
… No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed, it has been said 
that democracy is the worst form of government except that all those other forms 
that have been tried from time to time have failed.255
With the benefit of hindsight and international law, democracy is the way to go but it 
must never be doubted that democracy should be homegrown. The grafts from the 
West are an important starting point, but they should not be an end in themselves. No 
graft thrives if it is not properly embedded in the scion, and the scion in this case is 
the particular society. Incompatibility between the graft and scion can only be 
addressed successfully through a recognition that freedom of the citizenry is the key 
goal, and the real foundation of democracy should be subject to a much wider 
discourse rather than a simple technical checklist. Despite the allusion in this Article 
to the need to position democratic ideals within the particular socio-political context 
of a country, it is obvious that to look at every nation individually could be to study 
different socio-political structures for their own sake. Rather, with the invaluable aid 
of liberal democracy, its rich historical lessons, its defined detail and sophistication, it 
is an ideal from where we can glean what is “best.” After all liberal democracy has 
developed over a long time and has been a subject to great discourse and exposition. 
Nonetheless, leeway to refine and adapt its secondary features as opposed to basic
tenets should be given and this is important in embedding it firmly as a daily, practical 
concept rather than as a period requirement. Representation should be manifest in 
active as opposed to nominal participation such that “representation and participation 
[are] experienced as part of a continuum.”256
35
* BA (Monash), LL.B (Monash), LL.M (Monash). Lecturer at Monash University and doctoral 
candidate at the University of Melbourne, Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law.
**LL.B (Hons) (Moi), LL.M (Cantab), PhD (Melb). Lecturer in law at the University of Newcastle.
1 Antony Anghie, Civilization and Commerce: The Concept of Governance In Historical Perspective, 
45 VILL. L. REV 887, 909-910 (2000).
2 In the words of Carl Gershman: 
It has to be remembered that until recently there was a strong feeling that there was an 
alternative out there to Western liberal democracy. There was a belief in a higher form of 
democracy, one that emphasized results, equality, that could really achieve things. 
Quoted in Richard Bernstein, New Issues Born from Communism’s Death Knell, N.Y. TIMES, 31 Aug. 
1991 at 11.
3 Brad R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy Revisited: ‘Pro-Democratic’ Armed Intervention in the 
Post-Bipolar World, 3 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 481, 483 (1993).
4 See DAVID J. SCHEFFER, Use of Force After the Cold War: Panama, Iraq, and the New World Order, 
RIGHT V MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE, 19, 20 (Council on Foreign Relations 
ed., 2d ed. 1991) at 118-19. [Hereinafter RIGHT V. MIGHT]
5 BUREAU OF PUB. AFF., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE CURRENT POL’Y NO. 1240, PANAMA: A JUST CAUSE 2 
(1990) (statement of Luigi R. Einaudi, U.S. Permanent Representative to the O.A.S.).
6 Roth, supra note, at 490. See also, Scheffer, supra note 4, at 118-23. 
7 See G.A. Res. 240, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/240 (1989); CP/RES. 534, 
O.A.S. Permanent Council, OEA/ser. G /P/RES.534 (800/89) corr. 1 (1989).
8 See Scheffer, supra note 4, at 123.
9 Id.
10 Roth, supra note 3 at 491-492.
11 See FERNANDO R. TESÓN, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, 225 (1997) (observing that awareness of 
the link between human rights and peace has produced a change of opinion concerning humanitarian 
intervention and governmental legitimacy). 
12 Id. at 227-58 (providing examples of interventions in Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia).
13 See Domingo E. Acevedo, The Haitian Crisis and the O.A.S. Response: A Test of Effectiveness in 
Protecting Democracy, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL
CONFLICTS 119, 141 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed. 1993).
14 See CP/RES. 534, O.A.S. Permanent Council, OEA/ser. G /P/RES.534 (800/89) corr. 1 (1989).
15 Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L. 46, 47 (1992), 
where the author argues that representative democracy is gradually evolving from moral prescription to 
an international legal obligation in part based on custom and in part on the collective interpretation of 
treaties); cf. Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation to Political Participation in 
International Law, 17 YALE J. INT’L. 539, 540-41 (1992), where he notes that democratic governments 
have increased from nine to over sixty-five since the turn of the century. (hereinafter Fox, Political 
Participation). See also the collection of work in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, (Gregory Fox & Brad Roth, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2000)
16 INGRID DETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 42, (1994)
17 See, e.g., Fernando Tesón, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53, 74-81 
(1992) (hereinafter Tesón, Kantian Theory); Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign 
Affairs, Part I, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 213 (1983) (hereinafter Doyle, Part 1); Michael W. Doyle, 
Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323, 323 (1983) & John 
Owen ‘International Law and the “Liberal Peace”‘, in Fox & Roth (ed.’s) supra note 15, pp. 343-385 & 
Fox & Nolte, ‘Intolerant Democracies’ in Fox & Roth, (ed.’s) supra note 15, pp. 389-435, p. 397.
18 David Wippman, Defending Democracy Through Foreign Intervention, 19 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 659, 
661-662 (1997).
19 The Council of Europe, for example, makes democracy a pre-condition for membership. See Statute 
of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, art. 3, 87 U.N.T.S. 103, 106. Similarly, the O.A.S. Charter now 
36
provides for the suspension from the General Assembly of any member state whose “democratically 
constituted government has been overthrown by force.” See Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of 
the Organization of American States, Dec.14, 1992, art. 9, 33 I.L.M. 1005 (hereinafter Protocol of 
Washington) (while not ratified by all O.A.S. member states yet, this protocol amends the O.A.S. 
Charter); Christina M. Cerna, Universal Democracy: An International Legal Right or the Pipe Dream 
of the West?, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 289, 293 (1995).
20 See Fox, Political Participation, supra note 15, at 541; see, e.g., Acevedo, supra note 13, at 119-20 
(noting that the presence of monitors from the O.A.S. and the United Nations legitimized Aristide’s 
government when he won the election in Haiti). This trend began in 1989, when the Nicaraguan 
Government invited both the United Nations and the Organization of American States to help supervise 
its electoral process in order to verify the validity of the 1990 elections. Id., at 579-80.
21 Id., at 540.
22 See Acevedo, supra note 13, at 141 (recognizing that “the notion that the illegal replacement of a 
democratically elected government is still a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of its 
member states, and thus immune from international scrutiny, is no longer the axiomatic precept it once 
was”).
23 Modern intervention to protect a ‘democracy entitlement’ has its origins in the Reagan Doctrine, see 
supra note 6 and the accompanying text. This was a reflection of the East/West split concerning the 
development of self-determination. Prior to the Cold War both Lenin and Wilson believed that self-
determination was a right to self-government. However, Lenin believed that it was a right to a socialist 
government, whilst Wilson believed that it was a right to a democratic government. The Soviet 
equivalent of the Reagan Doctrine, was referred to as the Brezhnev Doctrine. See Reisman Allocating 
Competences to Use Coercion in the Post-Cold War World: Practices, Conditions, and Prospects, in 
LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER, 34 (LF Damrosch & DS Scheffer, ed.’s, 
Westview Press, 1991) & ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES, 14-18 (1995).
24 Acevedo, supra note 13, at 141 (recognizing that “the notion that the illegal replacement of a 
democratically elected government is still a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of its 
member states, and thus immune from international scrutiny, is no longer the axiomatic precept it once 
was”). However, as noted by some commentators with regard to the intervention into Iraq that “… 
international opposition to regime change [will] be assuaged if a democracy results;…” thus implying 
that there exists acceptance that intervention is justified if it results in the installation of a democratic 
regime. See Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, How to Build a Democratic Iraq, FOREIGN AFF’S,
Vol. 82, No.3, May/June 2003, 49, 36-50.
25 Bureau of Pub. Aff., U.S. Dep’t of State, CURRENT POL’Y No. 1240, Panama: A Just Cause 2 (1990) 
(statement of Luigi R. Einaudi, U.S. Permanent Representative to the O.A.S.), quoted in Roth, supra 
note 3, 490.
26 Roth, supra note 3, at 483.
27 For example the US’s extensive history of intervention has included military intervention to 
overthrow the democratic government of Guatemala in 1954 resulting in approximately 200,000 
civilian deaths; the Dominican Republic in 1965, where 23,000 US troops prevented democracy and 
instead installed a regime accused of massive human rights abuses; Grenada in 1983; and the invasion 
of Panama in 1989 to remove the very despot the US had supported and protected. See NOAM 
CHOMSKY, DETERRING DEMOCRACY, 14, 72, 144-149, 152-154 (1992). See also The Panama 
Deception, A GIL SCRINE FILMS RELEASE, 1993.
28 Tinoco Concession Case, (Great Britain v Costa Rica) 1 RIAA (1923) 369, 381-82 reprinted in 18 
AM.  J. INT’L L. 147 (1924).
29 HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 220- 21(Anders Wedberg, trans., 1961)
30 Britain in particular attracted scholarly interest when it stopped recognizing new foreign 
governments. The British case may have been notable for the unambiguous manner in which the 
British government articulated its decision to end the practice of recognizing new foreign governments. 
See Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments: An Analysis of the New British Policy and Practice, 
63 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1992, 231 (1993); see also, United Kingdom Materials on International Law 
1981, 52 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 361, 376-78 (Geoffrey Marston, ed. 1982). See also Warbrick, 
Recognition of Governments, 56 MOD. L. REV. 92, 92 (1993); J. G. STARKE QC, INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 133 (1984). Essentially the United Kingdom government’s policy was that it 
would consider relations with new governments based on that government’s present and future 
effective control of its territory. This policy was also adopted by the United States of America and 
Australia in 1988.  See IVAN A. SHEARER, STARKE’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 127 (11th ed. 1994). Now 
with many US commentators supporting the right to democracy, this policy may change.
37
31 For a detailed analysis of this problem see M.J. PETERSON, RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS: LEGAL 
DOCTRINE AND STATE PRACTICE, 1815-1995 (1997). For a brief but succinct enunciation, see Thomas 
D Grant’s review of Peterson’s book in 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 191 (1998).
32 M.J. Peterson, supra note 31 p. 55.
33 Id. Several prominent cases of state recognition in the 1990s, and admission into the UN of several 
European micro-states rekindled the volatility of the issue of legitimism even though then, democracy 
had crept into international legal usage and human rights were no longer a subject off limits to 
international law. For a detailed analysis of this problem see M.J. Peterson, supra note 31.
34 See, e.g., Ibrahim J Gassama, Reaffirming Faith in the Dignity of Each Human Being: The United 
Nations, NGOs, and Apartheid, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1464, 1472-88 (1996) (discussing the 
comprehensive global campaign launched against apartheid in South Africa).
35 Id. at 1480-88. 
36 Id. at  1478-80.
37 One interesting example is when South Africa attempted to declare Transkei an ‘independent and 
sovereign state’, through the enactment of the Transkei Act (1976).  Transkei’s independence was 
‘given’ by South Africa as part of Bantustan policy, itself part of South Africa’s Apartheid policy. The 
UN did not consider that this was a genuine attempt by South Africa to grant independence. Instead the 
UN concluded that it was an attempt to eject certain racial groups from South Africa, and to deny them 
South African citizenship. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,
222-228 (1979) Another interesting example is when Rhodesia declared independence in 1965. Both 
the Security Council and the General Assembly passed resolutions requesting nation-states not to 
recognize Rhodesia. See Starke, supra note 30 at 93. Both the General Assembly and the Security 
Council passed resolutions. See G.A. Res/2012/XX 12 October 1965 and S/Res/216 12 November 
1965
38 G.A. Res 3151(G), UN GAOR, 28th Sess, Supp No 30, para 11, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
39 The United Nations has known eight significant credentials contests involving China, Hungary, 
Congo (Leopoldville), Yemen, Cambodia (1973-74 and post-1978), South Africa, and Israel. The de 
facto regime was denied credentials in the cases of China (1950-71), Hungary (1957-63), Cambodia 
(post- 1978) and South Africa (1974), and narrowly prevailed in the case of Cambodia in 1973-74. For 
a concise discussion of this see Roth, supra note 3, at 495-499.
40 G.A. Res 396, UN GAOR, 5th Sess, Supp No 20, para 1, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
41 See e.g., I E Korovin, Respect for Sovereignty: An Unchanging Principle of Soviet Foreign Policy 11 
INT. AFF. (MOSCOW) 32, 37-9 (1956).
42 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) 
(hereinafter referred to as UDHR).
43 The International Bill of Human Rights consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and its two Optional Protocols.
44 See United Nations Centre for Human Rights, United Nations, Human Rights and Elections: 
Handbook on the Legal, Technical and Human Rights Aspects of Elections, United Nations Doc 
HR/p/ot/2 (1994).
45 UDHR, supra note 46 at 71.
46 Id. at art 21.
47 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 
6 I.L.M. 368.
48 Id. at art 25.
49 See Henry J Steiner, Political Participation as a Human Right 1 HARV. HUM. RTS. YR B. 77, 87-88, 
90, 93 (1988).
50 Id. at 91 (noting that an amendment requiring a pluralist political party system was withdrawn as a 
concession to the Soviet Union).
51 Id. at 93.
52 Id. It should be recalled that the Covenant embodies a “legal” commitment, whereas the Declaration 
was understood as embodying merely a “political” commitment. If the legal commitment that states 
have made since 1966 falls short of the political commitment made in 1948, it is difficult to argue that 
states should now be held legally accountable to the greater commitment.
53 See Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, above note 15 at 47 (discussing the 
problems associated with examining and monitoring elections for compliance with the existing 
ambiguous standards).
54 Gregory H Fox & George Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, HARV. INT’L L. J.1, 5 (1995).
38
55 See, e.g., Joint Communique of United States-Mexico Bi-national Commission, 7 August 1989 in 29 
I.L.M. 18 (1990); Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Document of the Moscow 
Meeting on the Human Dimension, Emphasizing Respect For Human Rights, Pluralistic Democracy, 
The Rule of Law, and Procedures for Fact-Finding (Done at Moscow, 3 October 1991) 30 I.L.M. 1670 
(1991) (Moscow Document).
56 See Fox & Nolte, supra note 549 at 3-5 (describing efforts of “the international community to 
address the perennial question of what makes a state ‘democratic”‘).
57 See, e.g., Daniel A Bell, ‘The East Asian Challenge to Human Rights: Reflections on an East West 
Dialogue’ 18 HUM RTS Q. 641, 656 (1996) (noting that most East Asian states endorsed the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights “for pragmatic, political reasons and not because of a deeply held 
commitment to the human rights norms it contains”).
58 G.A. Res 45/150, UN GAOR 3d Comm, 45th Sess, Supp No 49A, U.N. Doc. A/45/766 (1990) at 
255.
59 Id at para 4. A second resolution, passed over the dissenting votes of twenty-nine nations (mostly 
Western democracies), reiterated in even stronger terms the norm of non-interference in national 
electoral processes. G.A. Res 45/151, UN GAOR, 45th Sess, Supp No 49A at 255 U.N. Doc. A/45/49 
(1990).
60 Statement of Madeleine K Albright, U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Addressing the UN Security 
Council (July 30, 1994), in Security Council Authorizes Multinational Force ‘To Use All Necessary 
Means” To Facilitate Departure of Military From Haiti, Return of President Aristide, Federal News 
Service (1 August 1994), available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, FEDNEW File.
61 Report of the Secretary General, above note 14 at para 3.
62 Roth, supra note 3 at 511-512.
63 W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. 
INT’L L 886, 872 (1990).
64 Fielding, 338.
65 UDHR, supra note 46.
66 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, art 1, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3; ICCPR, above note 30 at art 1.
67 Franck, supra  note 15 at 79.
68 Id at 46.
69 Fox, supra  note 15 at 607.
70 Gregory H Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 86 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L.  
249 (1992). See also Franck, supra note 15 at 46; Fox, The Right to Political Participation, supra note 
15 at 539.
71 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act, 1 August 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 
(Helsinki Accords).
72 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the 
Conference on the Human Dimension, 29 I.L.M. 1305 (1990) (Copenhagen Document).
73 See Id. at paras 5.1-5.21 at 1308-09.
74 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Charter of Paris for a New Europe and 
Supplementary Document to Give Effect to Certain Provisions of the Charter (Done at Paris, 21 
November 1990), 30 I.L.M. 190, 193 (1991) (Charter of Paris). Leaders of thirty-four participating 
states of the C.S.C.E. convened in Paris and adopted the Charter of Paris on 21 November 1990 to 
initiate “a new era of democracy, peace and unity.”
75 Id. at 194.
76 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Document of the Moscow Meeting on the 
Human Dimension, Emphasizing Respect For Human Rights, Pluralistic Democracy, The Rule of Law, 
and Procedures for Fact-Finding (Done at Moscow, 3 October 1991), 30 I.L.M. 1670, 1672 (1991) 
(Moscow Document). The Moscow Meeting convened in Moscow from September 10 to October 4, 
1991 and was attended by representatives of the following participating states of the C.S.C.E.: Albania, 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the USSR, the United Kingdom, the 
United States of America and Yugoslavia. Id. at 1671.
77 Id. at 1672.
78 United Nations World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, 32 
I.L.M. 1661, 1665 (1993) (Vienna Declaration). The World Conference on Human Rights was 
39
assembled in Vienna by the United Nations on June 14-25, 1993. Representatives of 171 States 
attended. The Vienna Declaration was adopted by acclamation on 25 June 1993. Id. at 1661. The 
Vienna Declaration states that the focus of “[c] ooperation, development and strengthening of human 
rights” should be on “strengthening and building of institutions relating to human rights, strengthening 
of a pluralistic civil society and the protection of groups which have been rendered vulnerable.” To this 
end, assistance is necessary for “the conduct of free and fair elections, ... the strengthening of the rule 
of law, the promotion of freedom of expression and the administration of justice, and ... the real and 
effective participation of the people in the decision- making processes.” Id. at 1683.
79 Id. at 1665.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1666.
82 Fox, supra note 70 at 250-253. See generally Franck, supra note 15. UN monitoring of the elections 
can involve, as in the case of the UN Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti 
(ONUVEH), verification of the use of secret ballots, public polling places, and voter registration. See 
‘Haiti Holds Free, Democratic Elections with UN Help’ UN Chronicle, March 1991 at 62. ONUVEH 
claimed that “[i]n a country that had been traumatized by the experience of the election on 29 
November 1987, the first task of ONUVEH was to help create a psychological climate conducive to the 
holding of democratic elections.” Id. at 64.
83 Fox, supra note 15, at 251.
84 Id. at 250-52; Bartram Brown, The Protection of Human Rights In Disintegrating States: A New 
Challenge, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 203, 206 (1992); Marc Weller, The International Response to the 
Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 569, 574-577 (1992); 
Thomas Franck, Intervention Against Illegitimate Regimes in LORI FISLER DAMROSH LAW AND FORCE 
IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL WORLD ORDER 177 (Lori Fisler Damrosh  et al ed.’s 1992) .
85 Fox, The Right to Political Participation, YALE, supra note 15, at 541.
86 Fox, supra note 70 at 250.
87 Cerna, supra note 19, at 290. However given that desperately needed economic aid is subject to 
democratic reforms it is no surprise that third world governments adopt such an attitude: it also raises 
the question whether such action is a “free choice” and an accurate expression of the people’s will.
88 See Copenhagen Document, supra note 76 at para 6, 1309 (mandating that the participating states 
defend democracy); cf. Document of the Moscow Meeting, supra note 80, at 677-78, para. 18 
(affirming their dedication to democratic principles).
89 See Malvina Halberstam, The Copenhagen Document: Intervention in Support of Democracy 34 
HARV. INT’L L. J. 163, 166-67 (1993).
90 See Charter of the Organisation of American States, 30 April 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 as 
amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires in 1967 and the Protocol of Cartegena in 1985, art 3(e), 33 
I.L.M. 987, 990 (in force as of 16 November 1988). For a more recent integrated text of the O.A.S. 
Charter, including the 1993 amendments from the Protocol of Managua, see Charter of the 
Organisation of American States, O.A.S. Permanent Council, OEA/ser. G CP/INF.3964/96 (prov. ed. 
1996) (entered into force 29 January 1996).
91 See U.N. CHARTER, art 23, para. 1 (listing the permanent Security Council Members, which include 
China and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). However as Russia is now a “fledgling” 
democracy and China is experimenting with micro free-market economic systems, their traditional 
opposition to the West may not be as comprehensive as it has been in the past. 
92 See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti, UN SCOR, 49th Sess, 
at 3, U.N. Doc. S/1994/828 (1994).
93 Interestingly Kaplan is scathing of US attempts to restore democracy in Haiti. He notes that it took 
22,000 US troops to do so, and in a subsequent election only 5% of Haiti’s population took part. 
ROBERT D KAPLAN, THE COMING ANARCHY, SHATTERING THE DREAMS OF THE POST COLD WAR 65 
(2000). 
94 The motivations for the US-led intervention in Iraq are at the time writing muddy at best. The 
original official motivation as stated by the Bush-administration, of securing the world from threat of 
weapons of mass destruction has been recently questioned due to allegations that US intelligence 
services had deliberately mislead the international community with false or at best exaggerated claims 
regarding Iraq’s possession of these weapons. Such allegations have support from the UN appointed 
Chief Inspector Hans Blick, and are strengthened by the lack of discovery of such weapons after the 
conflict has ended, and by the fact that the US –led forces have deliberately denied UN inspectors to 
assist in finding these weapons. When combined with statements doubting the existence of such 
weapons made prior to the conflict by former UN inspectors, Scott Rivers, (see SCOTT RIVER & 
40
WILLIAM RIVERS PITT, WAR ON IRAQ, WHAT TEAM BUSH DOESN’T WANT YOU TO KNOW, (2002)) it 
appears that there were other reasons for the intervention. During the conflict the rhetoric from the 
Bush administration changed from emphasizing the discovery of weapons of mass destruction to 
‘regime change”, that is freeing the people of Iraq from the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein and 
replacing it with a democracy. Thus prompting he argument made here that there is now evidence of 
pro-democratic action, to create a democracy where none existed before.
95 Noam Chomsky supra note 27, at 14. 
96 Fox, Poltical Participation, YALE, supra note 15, at 545.
97 See Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century 
International Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 66-67 (1998) (noting the formalist model of sovereignty 
articulated by nineteenth century jurists).
98 However, international law did, on certain limited occasions, concern itself with the character of the 
government of a state when examining, for example, whether a particular entity was the proper 
government of a country for the purpose of conducting international relations.
99 The dispute between Nicaragua and the US ultimately was heard by the International Court of Justice 
in one of its more famous and important decisions. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar v 
U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Merits June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua v. United States].  
100 Interestingly the US as part of their support to Contras supplied them with 2,000 copies of two 
training manuals: The first of these, in Spanish, is entitled ‘Operaciones sicologicas en guerra de 
guerrillas’ (Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare), by ‘Tayacan’; and the second, “Freedom 
Fighter’s Manual, with the subtitle  ‘Practical guide to liberating Nicaragua from oppression and 
misery by paralyzing the military-industrial complex of the traitorous Marxist state without having to 
use special tools and with minimal risk for the combatant’”. The manuals were prepared by staff of the 
CIA, and were supposedly introduced to moderate the behavior and alleged human rights abuses of the 
Contras. This was subject to some debate, the ICJ noted however that the manual ‘…while expressly 
discouraging indiscriminate violence against civilians, considered the possible necessity of shooting 
civilians who were attempting to leave a town; and advised the ‘neutralization’ for propaganda 
purposes of local judges, officials or notables after the semblance of trial in the presence of the 
population.  The text supplied to the contras also advised the use of professional criminals to perform 
unspecified ‘jobs’, and the use of provocation at mass demonstrations to produce violence on the part 
of the authorities so as to create ‘martyrs’.’ See para 122 of Nicaragua v. United States.
101 In the subsequent dispute heard by the ICJ, Nicaragua claimed that: (1) The US had acted in 
violation of art 2(4) of the U.N. CHARTER and customary international law by the use of force against 
it; (2) The actions of the US — through supporting the armed opposition to the Nicaraguan 
government, known as the Contras, mining of Nicaraguan harbors, and other attacks — amounted to 
intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua, in breach of the Charter of the Organization of 
American States and of rules of customary international law; (3) The US had violated the national 
sovereignty of Nicaragua; and (4) The actions of the US also defeated the object and purpose of a 
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation concluded between the parties in 1956, and put it in 
breach of provisions of that Treaty.
102 At para . 169 of the Nicaragua v. United States].  
103 Id.
104 Id. at paras. 130 & 257. 
105 Id. at paras 134-35, 266-68. Judge Schwebel’s dissent adopted the Congressional finding’s most 
legally significant assertion, charging that the Nicaraguan Government, prior to its installation in 1979, 
“gave undertakings to the O.A.S. and its Members to govern in accordance with specified democratic 
standards and policies[,] ... has failed so to govern, and has so failed deliberately and willfully, as a 
matter of State policy.” Id. at paras 382 & 243. Although Judge Schwebel thus disagreed with the 
Court’s determination that the pledge to the O.A.S. did not rise to the level of a legal undertaking, id. at 
132,  261, he strongly endorsed the Court’s holdings that neither the United States nor the O.A.S. was 
privileged to use force to compel compliance with such undertakings. Id. at paras 132-33,  262, 385, & 
249.
106 Id. at para. 243. 
107 In the same statement issued by Congress on 10 July 1985, the US claimed that the Nicaraguan 
Government had: accepted the June 23, 1979, resolution submitted to the Organization of American 
States on July 12, 1979, which essentially state that the government would seek to introduce free 
elections and a democratic system of governance.  The Statement of Congress went on to state that  
‘…the United States, given its role in the installation of the current Government of Nicaragua, has a 
special responsibility regarding the implementation of the commitments made by that Government in 
41
1979, especially to those who fought against Somoza to bring democracy to Nicaragua with United 
States support”, and thus supported the “…Nicaraguan democratic resistance in its efforts to peacefully 
resolve the Nicaraguan conflict and to achieve the fulfillment of the Government of Nicaragua’s 
solemn commitments to the Nicaraguan people, the United States, and the Organization of American 
States”. See paras 169-170 Nicaragua Case. 
108 Id. at para. 258 of the Nicaragua Case [emphasis added.] 
109 Id. at para. 263 of the Nicaragua Case.
110 Franck, supra  note 15 at 82.
111 G.A. Res. 45/150, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., at 255 (1990).
112 G.A.Res. 45/151, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., at 256 (1990).
113 Dianne Otto, Challenging the “New World Order”: International Law, Global Democracy and   the 
Possibilities for Women, 3 TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 371, 384 (1993).
114 This very situation has occurred in Algeria, when a fundamentalist religious party whose policies 
indicated a possible end of the multi-party system, to democracy, and the creation of a theocracy. The 
Army intervened and in the bloody Civil War that followed, whole villages, men, women and children 
were butchered. The reason for the Army’s intervention has been attributed not as an attempt to 
“protect” democracy by removing a fundamentalist party, but to protect the Army’s “hegemony” and 
political ascendancy.  See Lahouari Addi, Army, State and Nation in Algeria, in POLITICAL ARMIES, 
THE MILITARY AND NATION BUILDING IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY, 179, 189 (Kees Koonings & Dirk 
Kruijt ed.s 2002). Presently in Iraq there have been murmurings of a Shi’a dominated theocracy. Given 
the history between Iran and the US, it would be unlikely that the US would support the establishment 
of Shi’a theocracy in Iraq. Is this a denial of self-determination and a “people’s choice”? The answer 
according to the US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld is an equivical “That isn’t going to 
happen.” See the article by Iffat Idris Malik, Democracy Without Islam, in WORLD PRESS REVIEW, July 
2003, p.11. If the Shi’a are denied, will there be a bloodbath to rival Algeria? 
115 Brian E. Porter Concepts of Nationalism in History, in GLOBAL CONVULSIONS: RACE, ETHNICITY, 
AND NATIONALISM AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, 93, 99 (Winston A. Van Horne, ed 
1997).
116 For example they agreed that France would no longer annex provinces and territories by force; 
instead new territory would only be annexed if its inhabitants chose to become part of France: thus in 
this manner, Savoie, Nice and Mayence all become part of France.
117 A. RIGO SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION, A STUDY OF UNITED 
NATIONS PRACTICE, 18 (1973).
118 Then there was the protracted conflict in Vietnam and the massacre of Vietnamese civilians by US 
military forces at Mai Lai.
119 Otto, supra note 113 ‘Challenging the “New World Order”: International Law, Global Democracy 
and   the Possibilities for Women’, (1993) 3 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 371, 372.
120 See George Bush, The Possibility of a New World Order: Unlocking the Promise of Freedom, 57 
VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 450, 452 (1991).
121 Gareth Evans, The New World Order and The United Nations, in WHOSE NEW WORLD ORDER: 
WHAT ROLE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS? 1 (Mara Bustelo & Philip Alston eds., 1991).
122 See James Kurth, Things to Come: The Shape of the New World Order,  NAT’L INTEREST,
Summer 1991, at 3, 4 (emphasis added).
123 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, NAT’L INTEREST, Summer 1989, at 4.
124 Otto,supra note 117, at 414.
125 MICHAEL IGNATIEFF EMPIRE LITE, NATION-BUILDING IN BOSNIA, KOSOVO AND AFGHANISTAN, 1 
(2003)
126 Id. at 1-2.
127 NOAM CHOMSKY, PIRATES AND EMPERORS, OLD AND NEW, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN THE 
REAL WORLD, 163 (2002) (Hereinafter referred to as Chomskey PIRATES)
128 NOAM CHOMSKY, supra note 27, at p 199.
129 Estimated at US $9 Billion in 1992, Id.  49.
130 Refer to the quote from George Kennan infra at note 142.
131 Chomsky, supra note 27, 53. In fact this is the reoccurring theme in Noam Chomsky’s first Chapter 
“Cold War: Fact or Fancy?”.
132 Id. p. 21. Chomsky argues that the Great Depression convinced political leaders that the measures 
introduced by the New Deal had failed, and all that saved the US economy was the massive State 
intervention in the US economy demanded by World War I. Thus convincing the political leadership 
that capitalism was not a viable system, without state intervention. Such theories were confirmed by the 
42
1948 recession. Arguably one of the reasons for the intervention into Iraq could be to prompt recovery 
in the current flagging US economy. 
133 Senator William Cohen, of the Armed Services Committee, as cited in Id. 30.
134 Brad Roth Evaluating Democratic Progress in Fox & Roth eds., supra note 15, 493-516, at 499-
500.
135 Michael Howard, Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, as cited in Chomsky, supra note 
27, at 18.
136 See Martti Koskenniemi, Whose Intolerance, Which Democracy? in Fox & Roth eds. supra note 15, 
436-440, at 439. 
137 ‘In order to stimulate entrepreneurship and strengthen the free market, post-war Iraq must begin the 
process of transferring resources from the public to the private sector’. See Adeed Dawisha and Karen 
Dawisha supra note 24, at p.48.
138 ‘In some cases the economies of the less-developed countries have become so dependent on exports 
to the international system that the requirements of their single-crop economies dictate continued 
participation in the very process that is victimizing them.’ THE END OF THE EUROPEAN EMPIRE: 
DECOLONISATION AFTER WWII (Tony Smith ed. 1975), as part of the introduction at xiii.
139 Id.
140As argued by Cerna supra note 19 at 289 & 294.
141 In reality ‘From an early stage in the Cold War, and for deep-seated reasons, the United States was 
set on a course against self-determination and democracy, rhetorical comments aside.’ Chomsky, supra 
note 27, 48.
142 Scott River & William Rivers Pitt, supra note 94, at 10-11.
143 See Richard Falk The Haiti Intervention: A Dangerous World Order Precedent for the United 
Nations 36 HARV. INT’L L. J. 341, 345, 352-353 (1995) (noting that an influential magazine rejected 
“the allegation that interventionary diplomacy was really imperialism carried forward under the banner 
of humanitarian intervention.).
144 For a critical discussion of the prospects for and desirability of creating a standing U.N. force, see 
Lamin J. Sise, Illusions of a Standing United Nations Force 28 CORNELL INT’L. J. 644 (1995): David J. 
Scheffer, United Nations Peace Operations and Prospects for a Standing Force, 28 CORNELL INT’L. J. 
649 (1995): Alex Morrison, The Theoretical and Practical Feasibility of a United Nations Force 28 
CORNELL INT’L. J. 661(1995). 
145 Wippman, supra note 18, at 686-687.
146 See, e.g., Falk, supra  note 143, at 356 (noting that U.S. intervention may be due as much to a desire 
to preserve a market economy in Haiti as to promote democracy).
147 See infra.
148 The whole concept of self-determination is dependent upon the definition of a “people”, and in an 
effort to provide such a definition, the concept of those who are suffering from alien and or foreign 
oppression or domination, was used and has become accepted as a rough working definition for the 
term “peoples”. For example in Paragraph 1 of the Declaration on Colonial Peoples states: ‘The 
subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of 
fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the 
promotion of world peace and co-operation.’ The Declaration on Friendly Relations states: ‘…and 
bearing in mind that subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes 
a violation of the principle, as well as denial of fundamental human rights, and is contrary to the 
Charter.’ Originally the expression of foreign and alien was chosen as a means of identifying and 
distinguishing a “traditional” Western colonial power such as Great Britain from a nation-state such as 
India which contained an ethnically diverse population. Please refer to Antonio Cassese, supra note 23 
at p.37 and, JORRI DUURSMA, FRAGMENTATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF MICRO-
STATES, SELF-DETERMINATION AND STATEHOOD, 17-35 (1996)
149 Tony Smith, ed. supra note 138, at xvi of the introduction.
150 MARC FERRO COLONIZATION: A GLOBAL HISTORY, 20-23, (1997)
151 Id. at 21
152 Id.
153 Franck, supra note 15, at 49. 
154 Otto, supra note 113, at 384
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Otto, supra note 113, at 379.
158 Id. 
43
159 Id., at 380
160 Patrick Parkinson, TRADITION AND CHANGE IN AUSTRALIAN LAW 15 (2001)
161 Id. at 16
162 Dawisha and Dawisha, supra note 24, at 37.
163 Id., at 49. A similar view has been expressed by the current U.N. Secretaty-Genreal Kofi Annan: 
After decades of repressive rule, there is a democratic deficit in Iraq, which needs legitimate 
institutions. Indeed, political life based on pluralism is having to be reinvented in Iraq. There 
is an urgent need for ethnic, sectarian, provincial and other components in society to unite 
into a single political community that is both respectful of the large cultural diversity of the 
Iraqi people and also open to ideas that help individuals challenge traditional structures.
See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragragh 24 of Security Council Resolution 1483 
(2003) S/2003/715, 17 July 2003, para.16.
164 Id., at 37-39
165 Id. ,at 39-49.
166 Id., at 49.
167 JORGE DOMINGUEZ, CUBA: ORDER AND REVOLUTION, 298 (1978)
168 It should be recalled that the Covenant embodies a “legal” commitment, whereas the Declaration 
was understood as embodying merely a “political” commitment. If the legal commitment that states 
have made since 1966 falls short of the political commitment made in 1948, it is difficult to argue that 
states should now be held legally accountable to the greater commitment.
169 Athens the most important Greek city-state had developed a form of democracy, as early as 500 BC, 
which lasted two centuries, before Athens was consumed by Macedonia. ROBERT A. DAHL ON 
DEMOCRACY, 7-12, (1998).
170 As Kaplan notes, Cromwell’s regime was far more intolerant and repressive than any previous 
Monarchy in English history. See Kaplan supra note 93, at 68. Cromwell was also responsible for 
crushing a revolt in Ireland during the 17th century.
171 For a discussion of the battle of Culloden from the point of view of the average combatant and its 
debilitating effect on the general population of the Highlands, please refer to JOHN PREBBLE, 
CULLODEN, (1961). 
172 ‘One is struck by a sacrilegious analogy when looking at images of the British presence in India, 
especially the pictures of the Great Durbar of 1911, preserved in the National Film Archive of London: 
the march past, the helmets, the discipline, the theatrical space skillfully and aesthetically organized 
along a plunging perspective towards the Emperor George V, the public held at a distance by cordons 
of soldiers. One cannot resist the feeling that this coronation foreshadows Hitler’s rallies of twenty year 
later. Is this a fortuitous analogy?’ Ferro supra note 150, at ix in the preface.
173 Tony Smith (ed.) supra note 138, at xii in the introduction.
174 Porter, supra note 115, at 105-6.
175 Id., at 106.
176 This is obvious even in the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy. Adeed and Karen Dawisha when 
making suggestions for a successful democratization of Iraq noted that: - “Not unlike the rest of the 
Arab world, Iraq’s bureaucracy today is simply a vehicle for ensuring full employment.’ and they 
recommend reducing the size of the bureaucracy to improve efficiency and to encourage the growth of 
the private sector. Given the huge social disruption caused to those former Soviet bureaucrats, and the 
massive unemployment rate, it must be wondered if this is such a good idea. Secondly they note with a 
degree of optimism that the democratization of Iraq will succeed because it has the world’s second 
largest oil reserves, thus raising the obvious question: what would happen if it did not have such 
reserve? What would another “poorer” fledgling democracy do? Do you need wealth to successful 
create a democracy?  See Dawisha and Dawisha supra note 24, at 48.
177 Koonings & Kruijt, (ed.’s) supra note 114, at 1.
178 Id., at 2. 
179 Id., at 18.
180 For further detail please refer to Aylin Guney ‘The Military, Politics and Post-Cold War Dilemmas 
in Turkey’, in Koonings & Kruijt (ed.’s) supra note 114, at 162 – 178.
181 Although the exact figure is unknown it has been reported that the conflict that erupted in Algeria as 
a result of the Army canceling the December 1991 elections won by Islamists has claimed at least 
150,000 lives. For further reference see Lahouari Addi ‘Army, State and Nation in Algeria’ in 
Koonings & Kruijt (ed.’s) supra note 114, at 179-202.
44
182 There were other reasons such as the government had interfered with the army and thus tried to 
interfere with the command structure. Another important aspect was the tensions with India, forcing a 
desire for national strength, thus providing the incentive for the army to play the role of state or 
national unification. Koonings & Kruijt (ed.’s) supra note 114 at 10.
183 Id.
184 ‘There are no bonds between the present Turkish government and the people. …The administrative 
machine is devoid of authority. …All officials accept bribes and are capable of all sorts of corruption 
and abuse.’ Id., at15.
185 The ‘incorporation of these issues into a military doctrine for political intervention  ... links the 
destiny of the nation and the interests of its people to the historic mission of the military.’ Id., 10.
186 Id., at 30.
187 Id., at 1.
188Id., at 30.
189 Kaplan supra note 93, at 64-66 & 73, where he states ‘Where a political system leads too far in 
either direction, realignment or disaster awaits.’
190 Dawisha and Dawisha, supra note 24, at 47
191 Kaplan supra note 93, at 64-66.
192 See Dawisha and Dawisha supra note 24, at 47.
193 Porter, supra note 119, at 99.
194 Dawisha and Dawisha supra note 24, 48
195 Kaplan, supra note 93, at  62.
196 Kaplan cites the example of Brazil, but the rise of organized crime in the newly created democracy 
in Russia is another example. Many African democracies have collapsed into virtual anarchy and 
“warlordism”. An interesting question is whether these situations differ much from the conditions 
found in Western liberal democracies such as Great Britain or France or Germany during the industrial 
revolution and the age of imperialism during the 18th and 19th centuries, where there was great poverty 
amongst large portions of the community, the “so-called working class”. Id., at 64.
197 Ignatieff, supra note 125, at 9.
198 At the time of writing Australian military and police forces have been sent to assist the Solomon 
Islands national government to restore order and security. One of the factors identified as an underlying 
cause of the crisis was the “rush” for independence by the Islands on July 7 1978, from their colonial 
overlords Great Britain. Also the Asian economic crisis of the 1990’s and perceived threats to their 
land, caused many islanders from Guadalcanal to resort to armed violence as a means to settle disputes 
over their land. See the report by Mary-Louise O’Callaghan ‘A Nation Unravels’ in the Worldwide 
Section of the Australian, Monday July 7 2003, p. 14.
199 The democratic government of the Weimar Republic had been imposed by the victorious powers of 
the First World War. Interestingly the US administration, noticeably the then Secretary of State Henry 
Stimson, and even Roosevelt who described Mussolini in 1933 as that “…admirable Italian 
gentleman…”. The US initially supported both Hitler’s and Mussolini’s regimes, even after Italy 
invaded Ethiopia, why: because they offered a bulwark against Soviet Bolshevism. Chomsky, 
Deterring Democracy, supra note 132, at 40. Support for dictators by the US administration is part of a 
consistent trend, throughout US foreign policy. The US even after assisting in the destruction of both 
Hitler’s and Mussolini’s regime, and establishing the Nuremburg Trials, in other words even after 
realizing their mistake and taking action to remedy it, after the war went on to sponsor, support and 
even assist dictators such Noreiga and Hussein, and even terrorists like Osama Bin Laden. Thus 
prompting the question; “Will the US ever learn?” The answer to that question is neither “no” or “yes” 
since the US will support anyone, dictator or humanitarian, for one reason and one reason alone: is it in 
the US interest?  
200 Kaplan, supra note 93, at 79.
201 Id., at 61.
202 Such as the theory of the separation of powers developed by French political theorist Montesqieu. 
203 The former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated in his speech opening the World 
Conference on Human Rights in 1993: ‘The process of democratization cannot be separated, in my 
view, from the protection of the human rights.’ As cited in Cerna,  supra note 19, at 289.
204 B. OJO, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER: UNIVERSALITY, ACCEPTABILITY AND 
HUMAN DIVERSITY 89 (1997)
205 Franck, supra note 15, at 48. Franck argues that this essentially affirms the “legitimacy” of the 
government. Other authors have defined legitimacy more broadly as follows: ‘Legitimacy-in other 
words- the internalized belief of the governed, whether subjects or citizens, which leads them to 
45
voluntarily obey without being physically forced to do so- is an essential basis of state power, and for 
that matter any form of power relationship.’ And further ‘Legitimacy, in this sense, is the mechanism 
by which a majority of the population supports a political regime, and recognizes it as operating in the 
people’s general interest.’ See Addi supra note 181, at 185.
206 ‘We have observed that the engine pulling the democratic entitlement is the craving of governments 
for validation. Without validation, the task of governance becomes fraught with difficulty.’ Franck, 
supra note 15, at 48. 
207  B. Ojo, supra note 204, at 87.
208 Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin Democracy and Other Goods, in Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-
Gordon DEMOCRACY’S VALUE 69 –91, 81 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Gordon eds., 1999). So 
what does this mean, that political parties represent divergent political philosophies, the traditional left 
and right-wing divide? Or does it enable a choice between different types of political governance, 
albeit within the democratic system of cyclic elections. Thus, authoritarian-style one electoral period, 
then a communist/socialist after that? Or simply a choice of leaders that have differing views on what is 
required for the particular community?
209 ‘Citizens cannot will wise authoritarianism into existence, nor can they remove an authoritarian 
regime readily if the political leadership proves to be unsound.’ Id. at 81.
210 This is the work of Francis Fukuyama, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992). For an 
opposing view, see Kaplan, supra note 93, in particular Chapter II, ‘Was Democracy Just a Moment?’ 
at 59-98, particularly at p. 60 where he states “The collapse of communism from internal stresses says 
nothing about the long-term viability of Western democracy.”
211 There has been the odd massacre of those Americans expressing their dissent with Us governments, 
and indulging in civil disobedience, such as the riots by African-Americans against slavery in 1712-
1741 in New York, and perhaps the greatest riot in New York in 1863 against the imposition of 
conscription where for four days rioters and police fought a bloody battle in the streets of New York. 
For more information see the famous account written by the journalist Joel Tyler Headley, JOEL TYLER 
HEADLEY, THE GREAT RIOTS OF NEW YORK 1712-1873 (1970). Although as the author himself admits, 
one must remain fair and consider the riots in their historical perspective, and not with modern values, 
however the point remains valid: democracies can and do commit human rights abuses.
212 Chomsky, supra note 27, at 16. On June 26 2003, the US Supreme Court finally struck down the 
Texas law and a previous Supreme Court decision in 1986 of Bowers v Hardwick, criminalizing 
consensual homosexual intercourse. The decision would appear to invalidate other existing legislation 
that prohibits consensual intercourse amongst same-sex couples. A news report at the time described 
this as a “major victory for the gay rights movement”. See Toobin: Regulating Sex Acts and Marriage, 
‘On the Scene”, CNN Law center, CNN.com/law center, http://www.cnn.com/2003/. What is more 
important that it took until 2003 for such a decision to be made, thus exposing that in the US today not 
all human rights are protected. 
213 John Chesterman, “An Unheard of Piece of Savagery”: Indigenous Australians and the Federal 
Vote in S ELECTIVE DEMOCRACY, RACE, GENDER AND THE AUSTRALIAN VOTE 29 (John Chesterman &  
David Philips, ed.s  2003)  
214 At the time of writing a great controversy was being waged regarding the accepted dogma that there 
had been massacres of Australian Aboriginals by individual colonists and Colonial police and military 
forces. 
215 Such as the Seminole Campaign, waged by General Andrew Jackson. Sadly there are many 
examples in the history of Native Americans. The campaign was justified by John Quincy Adams on 
the grounds of self-defense and furthermore blame was laid at the feet of the English who according to 
Thomas Jefferson, had incited the indigenous American peoples to fight and so were responsible for 
the subsequent “brutilization” and possible extermination of US native peoples. See Chomsky, supra 
note 27, at 16 & 34. Similar justifications can be seen being made for the war in Afghanistan, it was in 
self-defense, and responsibility for the deaths of all Afghans was laid at the feet of the Taliban and their 
support of terrorist Al–Qaeda. Interestingly, one of the world’s most notorious dictators Adolf Hitler 
later commended the US for “solving” the “problem” with its native peoples. See Chomsky PIRATES 
supra note 127, at p. 80.
216 Namely; US, British, German and Israeli “operatives”. The Columbian nationals who had been 
trained were later involved in the slaughter of innocent Columbian peasants. This was reported in 
Columbian Intelligence Reports, the Washington Post as well as a film clip produced by NBC. 
Naturally Israel claimed the Israeli personnel shown in the film clip, led by a Colonel Yair Klien, were 
acting on their own: like some sort of spy spoof, a “rogue element”. See Chomsky, supra note 27, 133.
46
217 Such as the destruction of an industrial complex by the CIA, which killed 400 workers, during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. Id.,113.
218 Rothstein, Robert, ‘Weak Democracy and the Prospect for Peace and Prosperity in the Third 
World’, in S. Brown and K. Schraub, RESOLVING THIRD WORLD CONFLICT, CHALLENGES FOR A NEW 
ERA, 16-50, 17 (S. Brown and K. Schraub eds. 1992).
219 Kaplan, supra  note 93, at 63.
220 Id..at 62-67.
221 Kaplan cites the example of The Peoples’ Republic of China, whose autocracy he claims better 
prepared its citizens for the “economic rigors of the post-industrial age” than India’s democratic 
government. Examining Latin America he attributes Chile’s stable, prosperous middle class and 
economic growth to its military dominated government of the 1970’s –1980’s and he compares Peru’s 
favourable economic growth to other “democratic” Latin American nations such as Venezuela, which 
he argues is filled with crime and poverty, with a “credit risk … behind only Russia and Mexico”: both 
democratic nations.  Kaplan attributes Azerbaija’s economic growth and peace to a coup. And notes 
also that the Ghanaian autocrat Jerry Rawlings who lead his people to stability. Kaplan, supra note 93, 
at 63- 70.
222 See supra note 203 and the accompanying text.
223 The authors wish to thank Professor Peter Rowe, the inaugural Sir Ninian Stephen Visiting Scholar 
to the Asia-Pacific Center for Military Law, for his insightful lecture entitled ‘Soldiers, Human Rights 
and International Armed Conflict’, presented at the Law Faculty of the University of Melbourne, 
Tuesday 17th June 2003, as part of the Australian Red Cross Solferino Lecture Series (this was the 17th
lecture in the series.). The authors wish to make it clear however, that what follows is the authors’ 
opinion not Professor Rowe’s. Given the problems and uncertainty surrounding the status of the 
internees as combatants, it is unclear what are their legal rights under the laws of armed conflict, and 
secondly because they are imprisoned outside the domestic jurisdiction of the US, they are not entitled 
to due process and other rights available under US domestic law. Thus the result of this is that the 
internees are denied the most basic of human rights: the right to a fair and impartial hearing. Whether 
these factors played a role in the US’s choice of location, in other words whether the US deliberately 
imprisoned them in Cuba, is unknown, but in the authors’ opinion highly likely. The authors do not 
share the confidence expressed by notably US commentators who have advised the US Department of 
Defense, that the military tribunals will ensure adequate protection and a just and fair trial. See for 
example the statement prepared by Professor Ruth Wedgewood Justice will be Done at Guatanamo, 
and distributed  by the BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PRGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE, at http: //usinfo.state.gov.
224 Kaplan, supra note 93, at 63.
225 Id. 
226 Chomsky, supra note 27, at 16.
227 The author notes that there is no doubt that Libya has committed breaches of human rights, but not 
on the same scale as say the US with its involvement through client states such as El; Salvador or 
directly in Nicaragua for example has been indirectly or directly responsible for the deaths of hundreds 
of thousands of people. Id., at 16 & Chomsky PIRATES,  supra note 127, at 81.
228 On 30 Jan 1972  the 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment shot 27 unarmed civilians participating 
in a Civil Rights march in Derry, killing 13 and wounding 14. The subsequent inquiry held by Lord 
Widgery accepted the claims made by the British Army that the soldiers had come under fire, and were 
thus responding to an armed threat. Accordingly none of the British soldiers involved were charged or 
tried. Indeed the officers who had planned the operation were decorated by their Queen. Interestingly 
proponents of the right to democracy argue that civil rights is one aspect, indeed a defining 
characteristic of democracy, and the shooting of unarmed civilians involved in peaceful protest a 
hallmark of a dictatorship, but how can a democracy be a dictatorship? How can a democracy commit
human rights abuses, and yet none can deny Bloody Sunday, and if you conduct a further examination 
of British history, you’ll find other examples, such as religious pogroms by Mary Tudor, or the Bloody 
Assizes and the boasts of Lord Jeffrey that he had hung more traitors than any before him even as far 
back as the Norman Conquest. For further information see I Thomas Babington Maraulay The History 
of England From the Accession of James II, 489 (1985) 
229 MUSGRAVE, SELF-DETERMINATION AND NATIONAL MINORITIES,153 (1997) 
230 There are additional examples, such as Indonesia and the violence in East Timor. East Timor finally 
achieved its independence some twenty-five years after the Indonesian occupation, by a referendum 
held on August 30 1999. The occupation has caused some 100,000 estimated deaths due to fighting, 
famine and disease, with most of the deaths occurring immediately after the intervention: this from a 
47
population estimated at 600,000 at the time of East Timor’s “willing acceptance” of integration. The 
damage to the economy of the region during the occupation was catastrophic. See Aditjondro,  
Prospects for the Development in East Timor after the Capture of Xanana Gusmao in (CIIR) & 
(IPJET) INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE QUESTION OF EAST TIMOR, 51-62 (Catholic Institute for 
International Relations & International Platform of Jurists for East Timor, London, 1995); & Clark, The 
“Decolonisation” of East Timor and the United Nations’ Norms of Self-Determination and Aggression
(CIIR) & (IPJET), International Law and the Question of East Timor, 66-68, at 65.
231 Musgrave, supra note 230, at 155. As mentioned above, the fragmentation in the former Republic of 
Yugoslavia resulted in some of the worst human rights abuses seen in Europe for 50 years. Kaplan 
notes that if China were to become truly democratic, then this would certainly result in the secession or 
attempted secession of areas in Western China where the Turkic Uighurs are the dominant ethnic 
group. Kaplan, supra note 93, at 64-65.
232 Certainly Franck raises this argument. 
233 The constant involvement by the US could be justified again for reasons of self-defense, in this 
instance against the evil Soviet Empire, but with the end of the Cold War such justifications obviously 
cannot be maintained and yet the US remains involved in conflict, the most recent of which is the war 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. With the possible exception of Israel, the US remains perhaps the only nation-
state to have been involved in conflict from 1945 until the present day. As noted by Noam Chomsky, 
the US has not reduced its overwhelming industrial-military complex, but merely altered its direction 
towards “low intensity” and urban conflict, rather than the great tank battles expected and planned for 
against the former USSR, as evidenced in the emphasis in training and courses taught at military 
academies. Chomsky, supra note 27, at 30-31.  
234 Israel’s human rights abuses can be traced to its origins in 1948, with the slaughter of hundreds of 
civilians in Lydda and Ramle in July 1948, and Doueimah near Hebron in October 1948. Often labeled 
as surgical strikes against “terrorist targets”; “preventative and pre-emptive” strikes to prevent planned 
terrorist actions; or simply as retribution, Israel’s actions have resulted in the countless deaths of
civilians, including children, rather than members of Hamas or any other armed group actively 
involved in fighting Israel. Then there have been the numerous attacks on Palestinian refugee camps 
and allegations made against the current leader Ariel Sharon for the massacre of innocent civilians. Just 
how many innocent civilians have been killed by Israeli forces whether by accident (such as when 
Israel shot down a Libyan airliner killing 110 civilians) or by design will never be known, but in a 
single attack near Baalbek, near the Bekaa Valley, in January 1994, 100 people, civilians, were killed, 
and 400 wounded, of which 150 were children. Chomsky PIRATES, supra note 127, at 76-80. 
235 There are also allegations of rape, looting and burning of Muslim homes and worse, the ripping 
open of the bellies of pregnant women, all in front of relatives, children included.
236 The report, ‘We Have No Orders to Save You”: State Complicity and Participation in Communal 
Violence in Gujarat’ was released in April 2002, and alleges that the Bharatiya Janata Party, which 
leads the national coalition government, were “directly “involved in the attacks against Muslims. 
Leading the attacks were extremist Hindu organizations such as Vishwa Hin…Parishad (World Hindu 
Council) and its militant youth wing, the Bajrang Dal, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, (the 
National Volunteer Corps).  Together these groups form the sanhgh parivar, which Human Rights 
Watch claim exerts much influence over the national government, and is steering India away from a 
secular democracy towards a nation-state, that marginalizes, discriminates and worse assaults, its lower 
castes and religious minorities. The report can be accessed at hrw.org/reports/2003/india0703/Gujarat.
237 For further information please refer to the Human Rights Watch website, which contains the report 
mentioned in note 237 as well as other information concerning the failure to prosecute by Indian 
authorities. 
238 Addi supra note 114, at 190
239 DENNIS W JOHNSON, NO PLACE FOR AMATEURS, HOW POLITICAL CONSULTANTS ARE RESHAPING 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, 170, (2001) 
240 Id., at 175.
241 Such as William Natcher of Kentucky (Congress) who spent a total of US $6, 766 in 1990. 
However, as noted by Johnson Natcher was in a “safe” seat. Id., at 174.
242 Bill Bradley as cited in Id., at 169.
243 Roth, supra note 3, 490 & 506-507.
244 Such prerequisites include near-universal adult suffrage, the right to vote in secret and to have one’s 
vote counted equally with that of others, the right to campaign, to form political parties, to express 
political opinions without interference, to seek and receive information, to have reasonable access to 
mass media, and to have an effective remedy for violation of political and electoral rights.
48
245 See Franck, supra note 15, at 57 (arguing that the right of self- determination is at the core of 
democracy and that freedom of expression and electoral rights are the other two components); see also 
Acevedo, supra note 13, at 143 (discussing Professor Franck’s argument); Cerna, supra note 19, at 295 
(stating that “(t)he existence of a democratic form of government (is) evidenced by fair and free 
periodic elections, three branches of government, an independent judiciary, freedom of political 
expression, equality before the law, and due process”). 
246 In many countries, systemic problems override the positive effects of free elections. In a number of 
Latin American states, for example, entrenched militaries, powerful business elites, lopsided patterns of 
resource distribution, and a history of human rights abuses all sharply constrain the ability of elected 
governments to alter existing political relations In some countries, in Europe and elsewhere, the 
problem is just the opposite: elections result in governments that are too responsive to the popular will 
of an ethnic majority, and insufficiently attentive, or openly hostile to, minority group interests. In still 
other countries, elected governments abandon democratic principles after attaining office. See e.g. 
Stephen J. Schnably, The Santiago Commitment as a Call to Democracy in the United States: 
Evaluating the O.A.S. Role in Haiti, Peru, and Guatemala, 25 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 393, 518-
23 (1994); Robert I. Rotberg, Democracy in Africa: The Ballot Doesn’t Tell All, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, May 1, 1996, at 19; Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder, Democratization and War, 74 
FOREIGN AFF. 70, 87 (1995).
247 See Brad R. Roth, Evaluating Democratic Progress: A Normative Theoretical Approach, 9 ETHICS 
& INT’L AFF. 55 (1995).
248 Cf. Ann Elizabeth Mayer Universal Rights Versus Islamic Rights: A Clash of Cultures or a Clash 
with a Construct? 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 307, 318 (1994) (where the author cites statements by 
representatives of Islamic governments to the 1993 Human Rights Conference in Vienna).
249 Id.,; Jim Mann, Policy-Makers Race to Keep Up with New Asia, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1993, at A1 
(quoting President Clinton’s denial that “democracy and human rights are somehow unsuited to parts 
of Asia or that they mask some cultural imperialism on the part of the West”).
250 See, e.g., Daniel A. Bell, The East Asian Challenge to Human Rights: Reflections on an East West 
Dialogue, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 641, 656 (1996) (noting that most East Asian states endorsed the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights “for pragmatic, political reasons and not because of a deeply held 
commitment to the human rights norms it contains”).
251 G.A. Res. 150, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49A, at 255, U.N. Doc. A/45/766 
(1990).
252 However, the cause of the Third World problems cannot be laid entirely at the feet of corrupt 
leaders. Many commentators, particularly those from those communities that are suffering blame the 
economic policies of the West for what they define as “neo-colonialism”. ‘According to the theory of 
neo-colonialism, most Third World nations have become dependent on the international economic 
system dominated by the Western … powers and Japan for markets, technology, financing and even 
basic foodstuffs to such a point that these less-developed countries may be called “hooked”: they 
cannot do with their dependence, but, just as well, they cannot do without it. They cannot do with 
dependence because their form of incorporation into the international system has tended to preclude 
their industrialization, relegating them instead to the less dynamic forms of growth associated with 
agriculture or the extractive industries.’ Tony Smith (ed.) supra note 138 at xiii in the introduction.
253 ‘Thus the direct political control through colonization is replaced by the indirect economic control 
of decolonization. The result is the same: imperial domination. From this point of view, the national 
anthems and flag ceremonies of decolonization were nothing more than ideological smokescreens 
covering a more rationalized economic exploitation of the world. See Id., at xiv.
254 Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 163, at para. 19.
255 Sir Winston Churchill in an address to the British Parliament. British Parliamentary Hansard, Nov. 
11, 1947.
256 See Patrick Thornberry, The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self- Determination with Some 
Remarks on Federalism, in CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT  MODERN LAW OF SELF- DETERMINATION: 
TOWARDS A DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY PRINCIPLE (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993) 101, at 116.
